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THE SKEPTIC'S GUIDE TO INFORMATION SHARING AT SENTENCING
Ryan W. Scott*
ABSTRACT
The "information sharing model, " a leading method of structuring.
judicial discretion at the sentencing stage of criminal cases, has
attractedbroad supportfrom scholars andjudges. Under this approach,
sentencingjudges should have access to a robust body of information,
including written opinions and statistics, about previous sentences in
similar cases. According to proponents, judges armed with that
information can conform their sentences to those of their colleagues or
identify principledreasonsfor distinguishing them, reducing inter-judge
disparityandpromoting rationalityin sentencing law.
This Article takes a skeptical view of the informationsharing model,
arguing that it suffers from three fundamental weaknesses as an
alternative to other structured sentencing reforms. First, there are
information collection challenges. To succeed, the model requires
sentencing information that is written, comprehensive, and
representative. Due to acute time constraints, however, courts cannot
routinely generate that kind of information. Second, there are
information dissemination challenges. Sharing sentencing information
raises concerns about the privacy of offenders and victims. Also, the
volume and complexity of sentencing decisions create practical
difficulties in making relevant information accessible to sentencing
judges. Third, the model's voluntariness is an important drawback. The
information sharing model rests on the heroic assumption that judges
will respond to information about previous sentences by dutifully
following the decisions of their colleagues. That is unrealistic. Judges
just as easily can disregardthe information, ignore it, or even move in
the opposite direction.
Despite those groundsfor skepticism, information sharing can play
a valuable role as a supplement to other sentencing reforms. In
particular, information sharing would benefit from a system of
* 0 2013 Ryan W. Scott. Associate Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of
Law, Bloomington. Thanks to Amy Baron-Evans, Craig Bradley, Brian Broughman, Anuj
Desai, Richard Frase, Nancy Gertner, Cecilia Klingele, Ion Meyn, Marc Miller, Ellen
Podgor, Kevin Reitz, Meghan Ryan, Michelle Spak, Kate Stith, Lua Yuille, and
participants in faculty workshops at Yale Law School, SMU Dedman School of Law, the
University of Wisconsin Law School, and the University of Cincinnati College of Law for
valuable comments on earlier drafts. Thanks as well to Benjamin Hugon and Daniel
Bradley for outstanding research assistance, and to Christopher Kozelichki for assistance
with the empirical study.
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sentencing guidelines, whether mandatory or advisory, and from open
access to the information on the part of defense counsel andprosecutors.

INTRODUCTION
For decades, prominent scholars and judges in the United States have
proposed an "information sharing model" for structuring criminal sentencing
decisions. In indeterminate sentencing systems, which prevailed throughout the
United States until the 1970s, judges enjoyed broad and essentially unchecked
discretion to select the appropriate punishment for criminal offenses. With broad
statutory ranges, no appellate review, and no obligation to give reasons for their
decisions, judges largely were left to their own intuitions in choosing a sentence.
One consequence was stark inter-judge disparity. Similarly situated offenders
stood to receive widely disparate sentences depending on the values, preferences,
and biases of the sentencing judge. Another was that no rational and principled
body of sentencing law could develop. To address those weaknesses, reformers in
the 1970s and 1980s proposed various methods of structuring sentencing decisions.
One leading approach, which this Article will describe as the information
sharing model, has attracted strong support among scholars and is experiencing
something of a renaissance. The idea is that judges should have access to a robust
store of information about previous sentences in similar cases. Armed with
statistical data, details about past offenses and offenders, and written opinions from
similar cases, sentencing judges can achieve better results. Information sharing will
promote inter-judge consistency and rationality, the argument goes, because judges
who understand the reasons for previous sentences can conform to them or identify
principled points of distinction. A distinguished and varied group of scholars and
judges has endorsed some form of information sharing at sentencing, including
Professor Marc Miller,' Justice Michael Wolff, 2 Professor Kate Stith and Judge
Jos6 Cabranes, Judge Nancy Gertner,4 and Judge Robert Sweet.5
The information sharing model is frequently advanced as an alternative to
more intrusive forms of structured sentencing, such as sentencing guidelines.
"Sentencing information systems" and other forms of electronic data sharing
1 Marc L. Miller, A Map of Sentencing and a Compass for Judges: Sentencing
Information Systems, Transparency, and the Next Generation of Reform, 105 COLUM. L.
REv. 1351, 1381 n.95 (2005) [hereinafter Miller, Map and Compass]; Marc Miller,
Guidelines Are Not Enough: The Need for Written Sentencing Opinions, 7 BEHAV. SC. &
L. 3, 20-21 (1989) [hereinafter Miller, GuidelinesAre Not Enough].
2 Michael A. Wolff, Missouri's Information-BasedDiscretionarySentencing System,
4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 95, 101 (2006).
3 KATE STITH & Jost A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS 168-77 (1998).

4 Nancy Gertner, Supporting Advisory Guidelines, 3 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 261,
279-80 (2009).
5 Robert W. Sweet et al., Towards a Common Law ofSentencing: DevelopingJudicial
Precedent in Cyberspace, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 927, 938 (1996).

2013]

THE SKEPTIC'S GUIDE TO INFORMATION SHARING AT SENTENCING

347

already form a crucial component of the sentencing process in some U.S. states
and in jurisdictions overseas. Missouri, for example, has attracted national
attention for its information-based discretionary sentencing system, which strives
to equip sentencing judges with better data about previous outcomes in similar
cases.6 And just last year, Ireland's criminal courts launched an ambitious
sentencing information system as a national pilot project. Meanwhile, mounting
interest in evidence-based sentencing-using tools like risk assessment
instruments-has highlighted the need for a better information sharing
infrastructure for sentencing judges.8
Surprisingly, however, the literature rarely grapples with basic questions
about the information sharing model. Is information sharing at sentencing feasible?
Can courts and other stakeholders in the criminal justice system effectively collect,
disseminate, and make use of a large volume of information about criminal
sentences? Can the information sharing model achieve its objectives by reducing
inter-judge disparity and promoting rationality?
Count me a skeptic. For structural and practical reasons, voluntary
information sharing is a poor stand-alone model for promoting consistency and
rationality in sentencing law. Despite considerable enthusiasm among scholars and
commentators, there is little evidence that the information sharing model can serve
as an effective alternative to other structured sentencing models. Nonetheless,
information sharing can operate as a valuable supplement to other reforms,
especially sentencing guidelines. And previous experiments with information
sharing at sentencing offer important lessons about what works. Think of this
Article as a skeptic's guide to the information sharing model. It advances three
related sets of claims.
The first set of claims is conceptual. Information sharing suffers from
fundamental weaknesses as a mechanism for promoting inter-judge consistency
and rationality. There are daunting information collection obstacles. To achieve its
objectives, the information sharing model depends on case-level sentencing
information that is written, comprehensive with respect to relevant facts, and
representative of outcomes in similar cases. But because of the complexity of
sentencing decisions, there is reason to doubt that sentencing courts can routinely
generate that kind of information. There are also formidable information sharing
obstacles. Sentencing judges rely on highly sensitive personal information about
offenders, raising privacy concerns about any program of data dissemination. Also,
as a practical matter, it is difficult to make the large volume of relevant
information available to judges in a useful format. The voluntariness of the
information sharing model is also an important drawback. The model assumes that
judges will respond to information about earlier sentences by dutifully aligning
6 See Ryan W. Scott, How (Not) to Implement Cost as a Sentencing Factor,24 FED.
SENT'G REP. 172, 174 (2012).
7 Carol Coulter, Website on Court Sentencing Launched, IRISH TIMES (Dublin), Aug.

3, 2010, at 4.
8 See J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and
Evidence-BasedSentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1340-47 (2011).
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their decisions with others. That is unrealistic. Judges can just as easily disregard
the information, ignore it, or even move in the opposite direction from their
colleagues' reasoning, at the expense of inter-judge consistency and rationality.
The second set of claims is empirical. To illustrate challenges with
information collection, this Article contains an original empirical study of data
reporting practices from a federal district court. The study analyzes more than four
hundred "Statement of Reasons" documents, which federal judges must complete
in connection with every criminal sentence. Because these documents are
ordinarily nonpublic, the study is the first of its kind in the United States. The
results reveal that, despite mandatory reporting requirements, judges rarely provide
the kind of written opinions necessary to support an effective information sharing
model. In 48.6% of cases in which a written description was required, the
sentencing judge did not provide one. Just 6.0% of cases prompted a written
explanation of approximately one page of discussion or more. Further, the class of
cases in which the judge provided a lengthy explanation differed in important ways
from the population of criminal cases as a whole. The study thus confirms some of
the challenges that courts face in collecting written, comprehensive, and
representative sentencing information.
To illustrate challenges with information sharing and voluntariness, this
Article discusses two previous experiments with the information sharing model.
Several jurisdictions in the United States and in foreign countries have developed
sentencing information systems (SISs), which are interactive computer systems
designed to provide judges with statistics and other information about previous
sentences in similar cases. Yet no research has shown that SISs contribute to interjudge consistency and rationality, and most systems have atrophied due to judicial
neglect. Similarly, a handful of federal district courts in the 1970s experimented
with sentencing councils, which are voluntary meetings of sentencing judges to
discuss upcoming cases. Research revealed, however, that the councils failed to
reduce inter-judge disparity because the sentencing judge retained discretion to
disregard the council's advice. Today, they are all but abandoned.
The third set of claims is prescriptive. If the Article's conceptual and
empirical claims are sound, then two features of a sentencing system might make
information sharing more effective in promoting inter-judge consistency and
rationality. First, information sharing is more likely to succeed as a supplement to
a system of sentencing guidelines, rather than a stand-alone mechanism for
structuring sentencing discretion. That is because guidelines provide a shared
vocabulary about sentencing, operationalize complex sentencing concepts, and
channel the attention of sentencing courts. Second, information sharing would have
greater impact if defense counsel and prosecutors enjoy open access to the store of
sentencing information. Although open access would accentuate privacy concerns,
harnessing the adversary process would greatly improve the visibility of sentencing
information and help guard against errors.
Thus, although styled as a skeptic's guide, this Article expresses cautious
optimism about the information sharing model. A carefully designed information
sharing system can improve sentencing outcomes. Nonetheless, it is doubtful that
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voluntary information sharing, standing alone, can meaningfully reduce inter-judge
disparity or promote rationality in sentencing law. Information sharing therefore
should be considered a supplement, not an alternative, to other structured
sentencing reforms.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the information sharing
model and the broad support it has attracted among scholars and judges as a
mechanism for reducing inter-judge disparity and improving rationality in
sentencing outcomes. It also distinguishes the information sharing model from two
popular alternatives: the common law model and the sentencing guidelines model.
Part II develops the Article's conceptual claims, describing the formidable
obstacles an information sharing model will face. Information collection will be
difficult because the model depends on case-level information that is written,
comprehensive, and representative. Information sharing will raise legal concems
about offender privacy and practical coficerns about the usefulness of statistics and
case information. Voluntariness also can undermine the information sharing model
by leaving judges free to ignore or repudiate the reasoning of their colleagues.
Part III develops the Article's empirical claims. It first reports the results of
the empirical study, illustrating the challenges in collecting information using
unique data from sentencing documents in a federal district court. It then discusses
two analogous reform efforts-sentencing information systems and sentencing
councils-and the mostly discouraging research concerning their effectiveness.
Part IV develops the Article's prescriptive claims. It contends that the
information sharing model would be more effective as a supplement, not an
alternative, to other reform efforts. In particular, it contends a system of sentencing
guidelines and open access to sentencing information would improve the chances
of success.
I. THE INFORMATION SHARING MODEL
Among scholars and judges, one frequently discussed method of structuring
sentencing decisions is the robust exchange of information among sentencing
judges. That approach-call it the information sharing model-differs from
alternative structured sentencing reforms, such as sentencing guidelines or a judgemade common law of sentencing. Yet proponents believe that it can accomplish
many of the same goals, reducing inter-judge sentencing disparity and promoting
rationality in sentencing law.

A. Two Key Objectives of Sentencing Reform
In indeterminate sentencing systems, which prevailed in almost all U.S.
jurisdictions until the 1970s, judges enjoyed essentially unfettered discretion in
choosing the type and severity of sentences. 9 Grounded in the once-dominant
theory that rehabilitation was the principal goal of criminal punishment,
9 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 9-38.
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indeterminate sentencing sought to maximize judges' ability to individualize
sentences and thereby help offenders to become productive members of society.' 0
Legislatures, in defining criminal offenses, often authorized a wide range of
punishments. For a single violation, for example, the court might have the option
of imposing a fine, a period of probation, or a term of imprisonment ranging
anywhere from a few days to many years." No U.S. jurisdictions provided
meaningful rules or guidance about how to select an appropriate punishment.' 2 The
decision of the sentencing court was essentially unchallengeable, with no right to
appeal.13 In fact, judges had no obligation even to give reasons for the sentence
selected.14 By design, this "black box" gave judges enormous discretion to tailor
sentences to the needs of criminals.
In the 1970s and 1980s, however, indeterminate sentencing came under
sustained criticism by scholars and policymakers, and in the last thirty years
criminal sentencing has undergone radical transformation. Calls for structured
sentencing addressed a wide range of concerns, including dissatisfaction with the
rehabilitative ideal and a desire for "truth in sentencing" undermined by parole. 5
But two central claims of sentencing reformers are particularly relevant here.
First, indeterminate sentencing produced unacceptable levels of inter-judge
sentencing disparity.' 6 Vested with enormous discretion and subject to little
oversight, judges were largely left to their own intuitions in selecting an
appropriate sentence. As a result, the preferences, philosophy, and biases of the
1o Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387, 389 (2006);
see United States v. Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79, 83 (D. Mass. 2004) (Gertner, J.)
(explaining that judges were expected to choose sentences "almost like a doctor or social

worker exercising clinical judgment").
" E.g., Bank Robbery Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-235, 48 Stat. 783 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (2006)).
12 MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 6 (1996).
'3 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 9, 197 n.3.
14 Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

542,
543 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998).
15 See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises
upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 4 (1988) (citing "honesty in sentencing" as
one of Congress's primary purposes in enacting the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984);
Leonard Orland, From Vengeance to Vengeance: Sentencing Reform and the Demise of
Rehabilitation,7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 29, 33 (1978).
16

The term "sentencing disparity" requires clarification because it is essentially

meaningless standing alone. Many disparities, or differences, between sentences are
entirely justified based on legitimate differences between offenses and offenders. Whether
particular differences between sentences are justified is contestable and depends on some
underlying theory of punishment. See Kevin Cole, The Empty Idea of Sentencing Disparity,
91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1336, 1336-37 (1997). This Article uses the term inter-judge disparity
to describe differences in sentences driven not by differences in offense or offender
characteristics, but by the preferences, personality, and biases of the sentencing judge. See
Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing DisparityAfter Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 6 n.23 (2010).
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judge played an important role in determining the sentence." Similarly situated
offenders, convicted of similar crimes, could receive starkly different sentences
depending on which judge was assigned to the case.' 8 Reformers argued that interjudge disparity offends fundamental rule-of-law values such as equality,
objectivity, and consistency.19 For the same reasons, inter-judge disparity also
harms the reputation of the courts.20 In addition, inter-judge disparity potentially
undermines the deterrent effect of criminal law by making punishment less certain
and predictable. 2' Hoping to achieve greater consistency between judges, Congress
identified the reduction of inter-judge disparity as a primary goal in the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984.22 Many state legislatures have followed suit. 23
Second, indeterminate sentencing resulted in irrational sentencing law. With
sentences overwhelmingly unexplained and unreviewable, neither courts nor
legislatures had developed well-reasoned, intelligible, and principled sentencing
law. Reformers hoped to develop a more rational system in which sentencing
courts would thoughtfully develop a body of coherent sentencing rules and
principles. 24 Congress cited improved "rationality" in sentencing decisions as an

" TONRY, supra note 12, at 7 (summarizing research that demonstrated
"[u]nwarranted disparities, explicable more in terms of the judge's personality, beliefs, and

background than the offender's crime or criminal history").
18 See ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE
SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT

36 (1974); Kevin Clancy et al., Sentence Decisionmaking: The Logic of Sentence Decisions
and the Extent and Sources of Sentence Disparity, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 524,
525-26 (1981); Norval Morris, Towards PrincipledSentencing, 37 MD. L. REV. 267, 273-

74 (1977) (describing the evidence of serious inter-judge sentencing disparity as
"overwhelming").
19 MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5-10 (1973);

Elyce H. Zenoff, Sentencing Disparity, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1449,

1450-51 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).
20 Memorandum from Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Dir., Office of Policy & Legislation,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Hon. William K. Sessions Ill, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2 (June
28,

2010),

available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/files/annual-letter_2010

final_

062810.pdf.
21 Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 237 (1989).
22 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 98-225, at 45 (1983) ("Sentencing disparities that are not
justified by differences among offenses or offenders are unfair both to offenders and to the
public."); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS

1.2 (1987); Breyer, supra note 15, at 4.
23 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-9101 (Supp. 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 app.
§ I (West Supp. 2010).
24 E.g., Edward M. Kennedy, Foreword to Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Symposium, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. ix, ix (1992) (describing the Sentencing Reform Act as
"a long overdue framework for a coherent federal sentencing policy" designed to

"rationalize this critical stage of the federal criminal justice system").
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anticipated and desired benefit of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.25 Many
states, too, have identified rationality as a key goal of sentencing reform.26
To be sure, there is lively debate among scholars about whether inter-judge
consistency and rationality in sentencing ought to be high-priority goals. 27
Excessive concern about sentencing disparity, for example, may distract attention
from other important goals in designing a just sentencing system.2828 Rather than
attempt to resolve that debate, however, this Article accepts for the sake of
argument that inter-judge consistency and rationality are desirable. Not only is that
premise enshrined in law in many jurisdictions, but structured sentencing reforms
are also often advertised as a way of achieving those objectives. 30 It is fair to ask
whether they can deliver on their promises.

B. Structured Sentencing Models: Guidelines, Common Law, and
Information Sharing
To reduce inter-judge disparity and promote rationality, reformers have
proposed various methods of- structuring sentencing decisions. Broadly, three
general approaches or models for structured sentencing have emerged: sentencing
guidelines, a common law of sentencing, and the information sharing model.
The first model, and today the most prominent in the United States, is a
system of sentencing guidelines. As of 2008, twenty states and the federal
government had adopted some form of sentencing guidelines. 3 1 Although there is
considerable variety in guidelines systems, sentencing guidelines generally consist
of detailed rules promulgated by an independent sentencing commission. 32 At
sentencing, the judge is required to make factual findings about the offense
conduct, the effect on victims, and the offender's criminal history and personal
characteristics. Based on those factors, the guidelines specify a sentence or
S. REP. No. 98-225, at 150 (stating that sentencing reforms are intended to provide
"enough guidance and control of the exercise of [sentencing] discretion to promote fairness
and rationality ... in sentencing").
26 E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-9101 (b)(1) (directing the sentencing commission to
25

"establish rational and consistent sentencing standards"); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
2153(a)(12) (West 2013) (describing similar standards).
27 Professor Stith and Judge Cabranes, in particular, disavow those objectives as
driving purposes of their proposed reforms. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 172-73.
28 See, e.g., id. at 106, 121-24 (calling the reduction of inter-judge disparity "a
worthwhile goal for sentencing reform," but also a "complex goal" that should not be the
"myopic focus"); Albert Alschuler, The Failureof the Sentencing Guidelines: A Pleafor
Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 901, 902 (1991); Cole, supra note 16, at 1337.
29 See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying
text.
31 NEAL B. KAUDER & BRIAN J. OSTROM, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE
4 (2008).
Id. at 4 (describing a "continuum" of approaches adopted by different states in
implementing sentencing guidelines); Richard F. Sparks, Sentencing: Guidelines, in 4
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 1458.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: PROFILES AND CONTINUUM
32
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sentencing range (such as 63-72 months of imprisonment). In some systems the
range is mandatory or presumptive, binding judges to impose a sentence within the
guideline range except in unusual circumstances. 33 In others, including the federal
system, the guideline range is advisory and thus allows a greater degree of
flexibility and discretion. 34 But the judge nonetheless must make the required
findings, accurately calculate the guideline range, and give due consideration to
that range when selecting a sentence.3 5
A second model with broad support among scholars is a common law of
sentencing. Most strongly associated with Great Britain, a common-law approach
has been adopted by a few U.S. states. 36 In the common-law model, sentencing
decisions are subject to review by appellate courts and may be reversed or altered.
Although there is considerable variety in how the common law may operate-the
appellate courts' power to vacate or revise, the standard of review, the prevalence
of "guideline judgments"-the essential feature of a common law of sentencing is
the regulation of sentencing judges by other courts in the judicial hierarchy. 37 As
described by Professor Kevin Reitz, the powers of appellate courts in the commonlaw model include "determinations of the eligible goals of punishment decisions,
and the creation of legal doctrine that translates those objectives into rules of
decision." 38 Like other bodies of common law, a common law of sentencing
evolves incrementally as appellate courts announce rules, carve out exceptions,
draw distinctions, and occasionally overrule their prior decisions. But it culminates
in a body of binding precedent, and sentencing judges must impose a sentence in
conformity with that case law or risk reversal on appeal.
The third model for structuring sentencing discretion, and the focus of this
Article, is the information sharing model. Under this approach, judges imposing
sentences are not subject to rules promulgated by a sentencing comission or
announced by appellate courts. Instead, sentencing judges have access to a robust
store of information-statistics, written opinions, and other case informationabout previous outcomes in similar cases. 39
33 Sentencing guidelines in Minnesota, Washington, and Kansas fit that description.
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-9101 (Supp. 2012); KAUDER & OSTROM, supra note 31, at

II (explaining that in Kansas, "[tihe sentencing judge must impose the presumptive

sentence stated in the guideline, unless there are substantial and compelling reasons for
departure").
34 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (making "the Guidelines
effectively advisory").
3 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).
36 See, e.g., Randall T. Shepard, Robust Appellate Review of Sentences: Just How
British Is Indiana?, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 671, 672-73 (2009) (describing the role of appellate
review of sentences under the Indiana Constitution).
37 Id. at 672-73.

Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A
Comparison of Federal and State Experiences,91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1441, 1454 (1997).
39 Eric Luna, Gridland:An Allegorical Critique of FederalSentencing, 96 J. CRLM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 25, 102 (2005) (describing a model in which "today's courts draw[] upon
the analysis and conclusions of prior judicial opinions"). Professor Luna describes this
38
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A host of prominent judges and scholars have endorsed some form of
information sharing as a way to structure judicial discretion in criminal
sentencing. 40 Professor Marc Miller has long urged more thorough judicial opinion
writing and data dissemination to facilitate the development of coherent and
principled sentencing law.4 1 He has also written extensively on "sentencing
information systems"-searchable databases of sentencing data-as a possible
reform for broken structured sentencing regimes.4 2 Justice Michael Wolff has
extolled the advantages of an "information-based discretionary sentencing system"
whose centerpiece is voluntary information sharing to assist sentencing judges.43
Professor Kate Stith and Judge Jos& Cabranes, in their influential work criticizing
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, have argued that the basic model for regulating
sentencing discretion should be guidance from other judges through written
opinions and data about previous cases.44 Judge Nancy Gertner has proposed
extensive information sharing among sentencing judges at the federal level, urging
federal judges to consult sentencing statistics and written opinions as a way to
"make better sentencing decisions in each individual case."4A Similarly, Judge
Robert Sweet has proposed that judges should have access to a store of written
opinions and statistics-a combination of "common law principles and modem
technology"-that would improve sentencing decisions.4 6 Professor J.C. Oleson,
among others, has endorsed sentencing information systems as a method of
facilitating evidence-based sentencing.4 7
Recently, the information sharing model has attracted high-profile attention
among policymakers. In February 2012, testifying before the U.S. Sentencing
Commission about the future of the federal sentencing guidelines, representatives
of the Judicial Conference of the United States stressed the crucial role of
information sharing for sentencing judges. 4 8 As Judge Paul Barbadoro explained,
model as a "common law of federal sentencing." Id. This Article reserves the term
"common law" for a system of binding precedent developed by the courts, rather than one
grounded in voluntary information sharing. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
40 Luna, supra note 39, at 102 (describing the information sharing approach as
"advocated by many scholars and jurists").
41 Miller, GuidelinesAre Not Enough, supra note 1, at 20-21.
42 Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Reform "Reform" Through Sentencing Information
Systems, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 121, 132 (Michael Tonry ed., 2004).
43 Wolff, supra note 2, at 95-96.
44 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 170-71, 176.

45
46

Gertner, supra note 4, at 277.
Sweet et al., supra note 5, at 928.

47 Oleson, supra note 8, at 1341-42; J.C. Oleson, Blowing Out All the Candles: A Few
Thoughts on the Twenty-Fifth Birthday of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 45 U. RICH.
L. REv. 693, 744 (2011); see also Jordan M. Hyatt et al., Reform in Motion: The Promise
and Perils of IncorporatingRisk Assessments and Cost-Benefit Analysis into Pennsylvania
Sentencing, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 707, 728 (2011) (discussing Judge Oleson's endorsement of
information-based sentencing).
48 Public Hearings on FederalSentencing Options After Booker: HearingBefore the
U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, at 9-10 & n.27 (Feb. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement
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judges "appreciate knowing whether their sentences are in step with other
sentences by other judges for similar cases," and they need a sentencing system
that provides that kind of information.49 In September 2010, the State of Missouri,
which has explicitly embraced the information sharing model, made national
headlines for its efforts to shape sentencing outcomes by giving judges access to
more information about punishment costs.5 0 As of January 2013, similar legislation
is under consideration in Vermont.5 Overseas, in August 2010, the criminal courts
of Ireland launched a website designed to share information about sentencing
outcomes, the product of an ambitious four-year effort to coordinate the actions of
sentencing judges.52
As a real-world example of the information sharing model in action, consider
how sentencing decisions are structured in the State of Missouri. In some ways,
Missouri law preserves a traditional indeterminate system: within broad statutory
ranges specified by the legislature, judges are free to impose any sentence.5 ' No
appellate review of sentences is available, except to the extent that a sentence falls
outside the statutory range. 54 Neither the legislature nor a sentencing commission
provides guidance to judges about eligible purposes of punishment, or about
factors to consider at sentencing. And nothing in state law requires that judges
issue written opinions-or even statements in open court-giving reasons for the

of Judge Paul J. Barbadoro), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative-andPublic_
Affairs/PublicHearings-andMeetings/20120215-16/Testimonyl 6_Barbadoro.pdf.
49 Id. at 9-10; Judge Barbadoro quotes Judge Richard Arcara, who stated in regional
hearings that it was "crucial" for judges to have "information about how the sentence that
we are considering compares overall with sentences recommended for this type of
conduct." Id. at 9 n.27. Along with Judge Arcara, Judge Jon McCalla testified that
"historical data" on sentencing is "greatly valued" and necessary to allow judges "to make
the difficult decisions required in sentencing on a consistent basis." Id. at 10 n.27.
50 See, e.g., Monica Davey, Touching Off Debate, Missouri Tells Judges Cost of
Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2010, at Al; Deniz Koray, New Sentencing Matrix Shows
Missouri Judges the Cost of Prison, COLUMBIA MISSOURIAN, Sept. 29, 2010; Heather
Ratcliffe, MissouriJudges Get Penalty Cost Before Sentencing, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
Sept. 14, 2010.
51

Peter Hirschfeld, Sentencing in Vt: Factor in Cost?, BARRE MONTPELIER TIMES

ARGUS
(Jan.
23,
2013),
http://www.timesargus.com/article/20130123/NEWS03/
701239955.
52 Coulter, supra note 7, at 4.
53 Scott, supra note 6, at 175.
54 See State v. Cook, 440 S.W.2d 461, 463 (Mo. 1969).
5 See Wolff, supra note 2, at 97 (explaining that because "[tihere is no overt guidance
in Missouri law as to the purposes for punishment," judges must "approach sentencing
pragmatically and, to a degree, subjectively").
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sentence imposed. 6 By design, "[j]udicial discretion is the cornerstone of
sentencing in Missouri courts."57
Yet Missouri breaks from a fully indeterminate system by adopting the
information sharing model. As Justice Wolff of the Missouri Supreme Court has
explained, Missouri strives to lend structure to sentencing decisions by insisting
upon "fully informed discretion."5 8 The Missouri Sentencing Advisory
Commission (MSAC), charged by the legislature to make recommendations about
sentencing,59 has created an interactive website to share sentencing information.60
Using the website, judges and lawyers can fill out a form that captures key offense
and offender characteristics. 6 ' Based on that information, the system reports
recommended,
aggravated, and
mitigated sentencing options.62 The
recommendations do not reflect the Commission's own judgments, but "reflect
sentencing practices of Missouri's judges" based on years of historical data. 63 The
idea is that judges should have access to accurate and up-to-date information about
what their colleagues have done in cases that share those characteristics.
Importantly, the information is provided on a "purely voluntary" basis.64 Judges
have no obligation to take the information into account, or even look it up. But the
MSAC believes that, by providing useful information, it can win the "hearts and
minds" of judges and persuade them to follow its recommendations. 65 It is the
perfect strategy for the "show me" state: show judges the information, then leave
them alone.
As the Missouri example makes clear, the information sharing model differs
sharply from sentencing guidelines or a common law of sentencing. It is intended
to assist sentencing judges, rather than constrain them.6 The judiciary generates
information for its own benefit, not at the direction of an external regulatory body
like a sentencing commission. The information sharing model does not depend on
legal rules that block judges from selecting sentences outside a specified range (as
in a mandatory guidelines systems) or in conflict with binding precedent (as in a
common-law system). To the contrary, judges retain essentially the same wide
See Mo. ANN.

§ 558.019 (West Supp. 2013); Mo. R. CRIM. P. 29.07(b)
(requiring only that the court "render the proper judgment and pronounce sentence").
56

STAT.

57 Mo. SENTENCING ADVISORY COMM'N, RECOMMENDED SENTENCING: REPORT AND

11- 13 (2005).
Wolff, supra note 2, at 97; see also Mo.
note 57, at 11-13.
59 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 558.019.6(3).
IMPLEMENTATION UPDATE
58

SENTENCING ADVISORY COMM'N, supra

Michael Wolff, Missouri Provides Cost of Sentences and Recidivism Data: What
Does Cost Have to Do with Justice?, 24 FED. SENT'G REP. 161, 162 (2012).
60
61

62
63

Id.
Id.

Wolff, supra note 2, at 98.

6Id.
at
65

97.
Id. at 97-98, 100-101.
66 Id. at 98 (discussing how the Missouri system is designed
to help actors in the
system to "focus on shared information" about offenses and offenders).
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discretion present in an indeterminate sentencing regime. Nor does the information
sharing model compel judges to make any specific determinations or to focus on
particular factors (as in an advisory guidelines system). Instead, the information
sharing model insists, in Judge Gertner's words, only that "judges need to see what
other judges are doing." 67 The information sharing model arms judges with better
information, but leaves them free to consult and act upon that information strictly
on a voluntary basis.
Proponents of the information sharing model contend that it can accomplish
the same goals as other structured sentencing reforms. Information sharing will
reduce inter-judge disparity, the argument goes, because disparity between judges
principally results from a lack of information about what other judges have done in
similar cases. Closing the information gap will thus close the disparity gap. Judge
Robert Sweet has predicted that an information sharing model based on written
opinions and sentencing statistics "would provide, almost automatically, a
firmament of reference points and a body of reasoning developed by the courts,"
thereby "alleviating unwarranted disparity" between judges.69 Similarly, Judge
Gertner argues that making sentencing opinions available to other judges is
"critical" to "cabining discretion" because "[i]n order to avoid inter-judge
disparities, judges must be able to see the decisions made in the courtroom next
door."70 Noting that judges frequently agree about the ordinal ranking of offense
severity, even when they disagree about the cardinal severity of sentences,
Professor Stith and Judge Cabranes predict that simply requiring written
sentencing opinions and disseminating sentencing data-to serve as "quantitative
guideposts to judges"-will reduce inter-judge disparity. In recommending
Missouri's approach, Justice Wolff remains hopeful that voluntary information
sharing will "eliminate some of these overall disparities and gross differences."72
67 Gertner, supra note 4, at 278-79.
68 Cf Zenoff, supra note 19, at 1451 ("[Some] observers believe that sentencing
disparity would virtually disappear if judges had access to data about their colleagues'
decisions.").
69 Sweet et al., supra note 5, at 943, 946.
70 Gertner, supra note 4, at
279.
7 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 176; Sara Beth Lewis, Book Note, Fear of
Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 901, 912 (1999)
(discussing Professor Stith and Judge Cabranes's proposal "that requiring a reviewable
written sentencing order would have sufficiently reduced the amount of unwarranted
disparity"); see also Jelani Jefferson Exum, The More Things Change: A Psychological
Case Against Allowing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to Stay the Same in Light of
Gall, Kimbrough, and New Understandingsof Reasonableness Review, 58 CATH. U. L.

REV. 115, 148-49 (2008) (arguing that sentencing statistics "would give sentencing courts
much more reliable information in making decisions"); Christina N. Davilas, Note,
ProsecutorialSentence Appeals: Reviving the Forgotten Doctrine in State Law as an
Alternative to Mandatory Sentencing Laws, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1283 (2002)
(explaining that sentencing statistics "could assist both trial judges devising sentences and
appellate judges reviewing those sentences, thereby reducing disparity").
72 Wolff, supra note 2, at 118.
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In addition, proponents argue the information sharing model will produce
more rational sentencing law. For one thing, the process of exchanging information
will encourage more thoughtful decisions. Robust exchange of information, Judge
Gertner explains, would encourage judges "to give coherent explanations, to
articulate rules of general application" as part of a continuing dialogue among
sentencing courts. Prompting judges to think through every sentence and to
explain their reasons for the benefit of their colleagues would improve the quality
of the resulting decisions.74 At the same time, information sharing at sentencing
would encourage more principled decisions. For Judge Sweet, an important
advantage of a robust store of information about previous cases is that it will
produce a "coherent and ever-adapting body of law" that helps to intelligently
translate "broad sentencing policies to individual cases."
Importantly, information sharing is not mutually exclusive with other reform
efforts like sentencing guidelines or a common-law model. Indeed, many
scholars endorse some combination of approaches. Professor Stith and Judge
Cabranes, Judge Sweet, and others endorse information sharing as a supplement to
a judge-made "common law of sentencing."7 Judge Gertner and the Judicial
Conference of the United States seek to promote information sharing in the federal
system to support a system of advisory sentencing guidelines. 78 They reason that,
even in jurisdictions with more formal or intrusive structured sentencing programs,
information sharing can serve a valuable function.79 Sentencing law should assist
judges, even as it constrains them.
Nonetheless, for several reasons, it is useful to disentangle the information
sharing model from other approaches. First, some jurisdictions (including Missouri
and Ireland) have adopted what might be called a pure information sharing model,
in which the sole mechanism for structuring sentencing decisions is a program of
formal information sharing.o An assessment of information sharing at sentencing
7

Judge Nancy Gertner, Thoughts on Reasonableness, 19 FED. SENT'G REP. 165, 167

(2007).
74 See Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for This Age of Federal Sentencing: The
Opportunity and Need for JudicialLawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 93, 104 (1999)

(arguing that "[t]he process of articulating rationales for their decisions enables judges," as
part of a "common-law dialogue about sentencing policy and practice," to "develop a
principled jurisprudence of sentencing").
7 Sweet et al., supra note 5, at 945.
76 In New South Wales, Australia, for example, a searchable database of sentencing
information has coexisted with other structured sentencing reforms for several decades. See
discussion infra Part IlI.B.
n STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 170-72, 176; Reitz, supra note 38, at 145051, 1489, Sweet et al., supra note 5, at 928, 937.
78 See Hearing,supra note 48, at 9-10 & n.27 (statement of Judge Paul J. Barbadoro);
Gertner, supra note 4, at 279-80.
7 See Gertner, supra note 4, at 279-80; Sweet et al., supra note 5, at 928.

8o See Coulter,supra note 7 (describing Ireland's new information sharing initiative);
supra notes 53-65 and accompanying text (describing Missouri's information sharing
model).

2013]

THE SKEPTIC'S GUIDE TO INFORMATION SHARING AT SENTENCING

359

is of crucial relevance to legislators, judges, and other stakeholders in those
systems.
Second, proponents of the information sharing model frequently recommend
it as an alternative to more intrusive reforms, especially sentencing guidelines. In
Missouri, the MSAC describes its information-based discretionary system as the
product of a conscious choice between two models: information sharing, designed
to assist judges and to win their approval, and a "regulatory," "rule-driven system"
of sentencing guidelines that can hope to command merely "obedience." 8 ' In
Ireland, the information sharing model was advertised and embraced as a way "to
avoid the proliferation of mandatory sentences with all their flaws."82 The same
scenario has played out in other jurisdictions, with the information sharing model
positioned as a direct competitor to alternative reforms like sentencing
guidelines."
Third, the information sharing model deserves separate attention because it
fundamentally differs from command-and-control reforms like sentencing
guidelines and judge-made common law. It rests on different assumptions about
how legislators and sentencing commissions can influence judges, and it faces
different challenges in shaping sentencing outcomes. Whether as a stand-alone
system or as a supplement to more elaborate regulations, the information sharing
model is designed to perform a distinct function, worthy of separate consideration.
Thus, the information sharing model is a distinct approach to structured
sentencing, embraced by many scholars, judges, and policymakers. Its proponents
argue that information sharing can reduce inter-judge disparity and promote
rationality in sentencing. The remainder of this Article evaluates those claims, first
exposing the information sharing model's weaknesses and later exploring what
constructive role it can play in pursuing its objectives.
II. FUNDAMENTAL WEAKNESSES OF THE INFORMATION SHARING MODEL
There is reason for skepticism that information sharing can meaningfully
reduce inter-judge disparity and promote rationality in sentencing law.
Conceptually, the information sharing model suffers from three fundamental
weaknesses. First, there are challenges in collecting sentencing information. To
succeed, the information sharing model depends on written, comprehensive, and
representative information about sentencing practices. But as a practical matter that
information is difficult to assemble. Second, there are challenges in disseminating
sentencing information. Concerns about the privacy of offenders and victims,
coupled with challenges in making the information accessible and useful for
81 See Wolff, supra note 2, at 100-01.

82 Tom O'Malley, Creativity and PrincipledDiscretion over Sentencing
a Necessity,
IRISH TIMES (Dublin), Dec. 19, 2011, at 20.
8 See Neil Hutton & Cyrus Tata, A Sentencing Exception? Changing Sentencing
Policy in Scotland, 22 FED. SENT'G REP. 272, 275 (2010) (describing how judges in

Scotland proposed information sharing at sentencing as a defensive measure, hoping to

ward off calls for more intrusive regulation).
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judges, arise even if extensive information is available. Third, voluntariness
presents serious challenges. By ignoring or disregarding information about how
their colleagues have handled similar cases, judges can exacerbate inter-judge
disparity and undermine rationality.
Before reviewing the empirical evidence and possible strategies for
overcoming them, a description of each set of challenges is in order.
A. Information Collection Challenges

The most daunting challenge to the information sharing model is collecting
sufficient information about the reasoning and results of past sentencing decisions.
To succeed, the information sharing model requires a store of information about
previous cases-for example, written opinions, offense and offender data, or
aggregate statistics-made available to judges at sentencing.84 But two
characteristics of sentencing decisions make information sharing particularly
difficult in this context.
One characteristic is volume. Courts in the United States impose a staggering
number of criminal sentences each year. Because plea bargaining has become the
dominant method of adjudicating guilt or innocence, only a tiny fraction of cases
end in trial.85 As of 2004, however, roughly two-thirds of criminal cases ended in a
guilty plea, conviction, and sentence. In state systems, each year more than 1.07
million adults receive a sentence for a felony conviction.17 In the federal system,
more than eighty-six thousand criminal sentences are imposed annually.88 Those
overall figures also mask considerable variability in volume between jurisdictions
and courtrooms. In some state courts, judges may impose fifty sentences per week
or more than two thousand per year. 89
The other characteristic is complexity. Sentencing decisions typically require
that judges consider a startling number of factors. Under a typical sentencing
84

See Luna, supra note 39, at 102.

85 EXAMINING THE WORK OF THE STATE COURTS,

2002: A

NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 61 (Brian J. Ostrom, Neal B. Kauder & Robert C.
LaFountain eds., 2003) (noting that approximately 3% of criminal cases in state courts

nationwide were resolved at trial in 2001).
86 Id. at 61, 89 (explaining that nationally 65% of cases result in a guilty plea, and
most trials result in a conviction).
See

R.

& PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU
No. 215646, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2004,
at 1 (2007), availableat http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc04.pdf (estimating that
1,079,000 adults were convicted of felonies and sentenced in state courts in 2004).
88 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS tbl.1 (16th ed. 2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data andStatistics/
AnnualReports andSourcebooks/201 1/Table0l.pdf.
89 Paula C. Johnson, The Social Construction of Identity in Criminal Cases: Cinema
Verit6 and the Pedagogy of Vincent Chin, I MICH. J. RACE & L. 347, 456 (1996) (quoting
WHO KILLED VINCENT CHIN? (Filmmakers Library 1988) (statement of Wayne Cnty.,
87

MATTHEW

DUROSE

OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BULL.,

Mich., Cir. Ct. J. Charles Kaufman)).
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statute, the judge must take into account the totality of the circumstances
surrounding both the offense and the personal characteristics of the offender. 90 The
offense may be limited to a single incident, or it may involve a sprawling series of
actions over many years. The judge must consider the offender's acts, omissions,
and state of mind, as well as the harm caused by the crime. Considering the
offender's personal characteristics requires a review of the offender's entire life,
before and after the offense. The number of moving parts is staggering: criminal
history, assistance to the government, educational background, employment
history, mental health, good deeds, public service, drug and alcohol addiction,
childhood opportunities, family life, prospects for treatment, actions in pretrial
detention, and on and on. In the words of one federal probation officer, at
sentencing a judge must consider "a narrative of the individual from the day of his
birth to the moment of his conviction." 9 ' And the inquiry does not end with the
defendant since the court also may consider how the sentence would affect the
offender's family, the victims, and the victims' families. 92
Compounding the complexity, sentencing judges must consider those facts in
light of a wide range of purposes of punishment, which may be in tension with one
another. Most jurisdictions in the United States have a "laundry list" statute that
directs sentencing judges to take into account retribution, general and specific
deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and various and sundry other goals,
without assigning priority to any of them. 93 In many corners of legal doctrine,
judges and lawyers complain about the hopeless imprecision of "multi-factor
balancing tests." 94 Think of sentencing as the ultimate example: a test with an
infinite number of factors and no instructions about how to balance them.
These features of sentencing decisions make it difficult to generate the kind of
robust store of information required to support the information sharing model.
90 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006) ("The court, in determining the particular
sentence to be imposed, shall consider . .. the nature and circumstances of the offense and
the history and characteristics of the defendant .
9' Garry Sturgess, U.S. v. Barry: They've Only Just Begun, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 20,

1990, at I (quoting Arthur Carrington of the Probation Office in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia); see also Div. OF PROB., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,

PUB. No. 105, THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT I (rev. ed. 1984) (presentence

reports are designed, among other things, to "help[] the reader understand the world in
which the defendant lives").
92 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(B) (requiring that presentence reports include

information about the financial, social, psychological, and medical impact of the offense on
victims); see also Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4) (granting crime
victims the right "to be reasonably heard" at sentencing).
93 See e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2) (1962); KEVIN REITZ,
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 71 (2003) (describing the "multiple choice" approach

adopted by statute in most states).

94 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Nixon Now: The Courts and the PresidencyAfter

Twenty-Five Years, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1337, 1379 (1999) (criticizing legal standards that
"suffer[] from all the imprecisions and uncertainties of unfocused, multi-factor balancing
tests").
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Specifically, to reduce inter-judge disparity and promote rationality, the
information made available to judges must be (1) written information,
(2) comprehensive with respect to material facts, and (3) representative of other
sentences in similar cases. On each score there is reason for skepticism.
1. Written Information About Sentences

Initially, the information sharing model depends on sentencing information
that is written. It is not enough that judges identify relevant facts, formulate
reasons, choose a sentence, and then enter judgment. Those facts and reasons must
be reduced to writing and collected in some central store of information if future
courts hope to rely upon them for guidance.
At a minimum, that means a lot of data entry. For each case, someone would
need to record information about the case, perhaps working from a long checklist
of relevant offense and offender characteristics. Given the complexity of
sentencing decisions, the amount of information collected in each case could be
enormous, and the process correspondingly costly. In the federal system, for
example, the U.S. Sentencing Commission employs around thirty full-time staff to
review sentencing documents and perform data entry,96 and many states handle a
much higher volume of criminal cases.
The deeper problem, however, is that the information sharing model requires
more than raw data. A checklist of facts, standing alone, is a poor substitute for a
written sentencing opinion because it does not disclose the judge's reasoning.
Although it may suggest possibilities, documenting potential aggravating or
mitigating factors, it captures neither the factors the judge deems most relevant nor
the judge's process of prioritizing and balancing them. Leaving future judges to
guess about the rationale for the sentence would not improve the rationality of
sentencing outcomes. The information sharing model strives to foster a thoughtful
and continuing dialogue in which judges discern the basis for previous sentences
and then either accept that reasoning or draw principled distinctions. Such a
dialogue is impossible without some written account of the judge's reasoning.
Thus, as proponents readily acknowledge, written opinions are the lifeblood of the
information sharing approach. 9
There is reason to doubt, however, that sentencing courts can generate enough
written opinions to support effective information sharing. For years, scholars have
been urging sentencing judges to issue full-fledged published sentencing decisions
more frequently.98 Yet the overwhelming majority of sentencing decisions in the
United States remain unpublished-indeed, never written down.99
95 Gertner, supra note 4, at 278.

Interview with Paul Hofer, former Special Projects Dir., U.S. Sentencing Comm'n,
June 2009.
97 See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 170; see also Gertner,supra note 4, at 279
("Wider use and availability of formal sentencing opinions is therefore critical .... ).
98 See, e.g., Lynn Adelman & Don Deitrich, Rita, District Court Discretion, and
96

Fairnessin FederalSentencing, 85 DENV. U. L. REv. 51, 54-55 (2007); Sweet et al., supra
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Typically, rather than prepare a written explanation, the judge announces the
reasons for the sentence in open court. Although many sentencing hearings are
audio recorded, most are not transcribed because they are never needed. 00 And
even if a written transcript is prepared, only a fraction of those transcripts ever
become public or otherwise available to otherjudges in future cases.'ot
Hearing transcripts, moreover, do a poor job of capturing the judge's
reasoning. Statements in open court are primarily directed at the offender, lawyers,
witnesses, and observers in the courtroom-not future judges.102 Often cluttered
with irrelevant material, jarred by interruptions, and disorganized, a sentencing
transcript is a poor substitute for a written opinion explaining the reasons for a
sentence.103
The vanishingly small rate of written sentencing opinions is not the product of
laziness or obstinacy. District court judges operate under acute time constraints. As
Professor Frank Bowman has observed in another context, "The coin of the realm,
the scarcest resource, in federal district court is time," and many judges
understandably "begrudge the time it takes to deal with sentencing issues."' 0 4 The
sheer volume of sentencing decisions forces judges to forego a written opinion in
most cases.
2. Comprehensive Information About Sentences

Second, to accomplish its goals, the information sharing model depends on
sentencing information that is comprehensive. A written opinion or other record of
a case must capture the full range of potentially relevant facts and factors-

note 5, at 940; Steven L. Chanenson, Write On!, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 146, 147
(2006), http://www.thepocketpart.org/images/pdfs/1.pdf.
99 See Uri J. Schild, Statistical Information Systems for Sentencing: A Cookbook, 6
INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 125, 131 (1998) (noting that "published law reports" contain

detailed descriptions of only a tiny fraction of all sentences). By law, judges in the United
States generally have no obligation to produce a written sentencing opinion, even if they
must state the reasons for the sentence in court. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2006 &

Supp. V 2012).
'00 Transcription of sentencing hearings, like other proceedings, is not free. Because
the government pays such litigation costs both for the prosecution and for indigent
offenders, transcripts generally are not prepared unless needed in subsequent proceedings,
such as an appeal.
101 Sweet et al., supra note 5, at 940.

102 For excellent commentary on the task of the judge in announcing a sentence in
open court, see D. Brock Hornby, Speaking in Sentences, 14 GREEN BAG 2D 147, 157-60
(2011).
103 Indeed, from time to time appellate courts vacate a sentence and remand the case,
not because the sentence is necessarily unlawful, but because the sentencing transcript
provides an insufficient explanation of the decision.
104 Frank 0. Bowman, III, Thoughts on Fear of Judging and the State of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 299, 356 (2000).
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including, crucially, those that the judge does not find especially salient. Otherwise
future judges cannot reliably compare new cases to previously decided cases.
To illustrate the need for comprehensive information, suppose that two judges
impose sentences in identical burglary cases. Both offenders violently broke into a
private residence at night, armed with a loaded handgun, and stole personal
property worth $5,000 before being confronted by the terrified homeowner. Both
offenders also pleaded guilty, expressed remorse, have identical criminal histories
consisting of a single petty juvenile conviction five years ago, and enjoy strong
support from loving families.
The first judge imposes a sentence of two years of probation. In a written
opinion, the judge explains that there is no need for a prison sentence in light of the
offender's spotless criminal record, prospects for rehabilitation, and low risk of
recidivism. But the opinion is not comprehensive. It notes the dollar amount of the
theft, but does not specifically mention the handgun or the fact that the homeowner
confronted the burglar.
The second judge reads the written opinion and mistakenly believes that the
cases are very different. The second judge imposes a sentence of three years of
imprisonment. Unlike the first case, the judge reasons, this case involved an inperson confrontation with a homeowner startled by a burglar in the middle of the
night. That encounter, along with the loaded handgun, made this offense much
more dangerous and the offender more culpable. Those factors, in the second
judge's view, outweigh the others.'
The result is stark inter-judge disparity, although the judges did not realize it.
Even though the offenses and offenders were in fact identical, the second judge
received incomplete-and therefore misleading-information about the earlier
case. Without comprehensive written opinions, capturing even factors the judge
deems relatively unimportant, the information sharing model can malfunction.' 05
Unfortunately, there is reason to doubt that comprehensive sentencing
information can be routinely captured. The basic problem is limited time, which
prevents even the most committed judges from routinely writing detailed opinions
that predict, disclose, and discuss all factors that future judges might find relevant.
In addition, however, two distinctive characteristics of sentencing opinions make it
difficult to generate comprehensive sentencing information.
First, written sentencing opinions are designed not merely to announce the
sentence, but also to persuade the reader that the sentence is reasonable. The
central challenge of the sentencing judge is to weigh a complex mixture of
aggravating and mitigating factors and to strike an appropriate balance.'06 Written
opinions, therefore, do not catalogue in exhaustive detail all potentially relevant

Austin Lovegrove has made a similar observation in evaluating the Scottish
Sentencing Information System. See Lovegrove, supra note 105, at 39-40.
106 Schild, supra note 99, at 125 ("Sentencing consists in trying to reconcile a number
105

of totally irreconcilable facts.").
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factors. Judges naturally focus on the facts and factors they find most persuasive
while downplaying others. 0 7
Second, the review structure of sentencing decisions also makes it tempting to
write an abbreviated opinion. In any given case, there is little risk that the
judgment will be questioned because no other district court judge reviews the case
or writes a dissent.108 Although appellate review of sentences is available in most
jurisdictions, criminal defendants frequently waive the right to appeal,' 09 and in
any event the chances of a successful appeal are very low."o
Moreover, when judges anticipate that the parties may appeal from a sentence,
they have strategic incentives to provide fewer details. Judges do not like to be
reversed on appeal,"' and detailed sentencing opinions sometimes increase the risk
of reversal. An appellate court might be forced to vacate and remand based on a
stray reference to a prohibited factor, a misstatement of a relatively minor fact, or
an artless phrase that sounds too much like a legal error. Outside of especially
complex or controversial cases, writing a long opinion is asking for trouble. A
simple announcement from the bench or a terse written order gives the parties little
to go on, and therefore little to attack.
In theory, exhaustive data entry could compensate for gaps in the written
explanation. A member of the court staff, for example, could complete a checklist
in every burglary case that indicates the presence of a weapon or an encounter with
a victim. That way, future judges could see a complete picture of the case even if
the written opinion contains omissions. As a practical matter, however, such
comprehensive data entry is prohibitively costly. Every sentencing decision
involves a theoretically infinite number of facts and factors, especially when
including those not relevant in the particular case. No court system can realistically
code and transmit that kind of hyperdetailed information for every sentence.112
Accordingly, the need for comprehensive information forces a choice between
107

Cf ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,'MAKING YOUR
CASE: THE ART OF

PERSUADING JUDGES 94 (2008) (advising lawyers, in drafting a brief, to persuade the

reader by "putting some facts in high relief and some in low relief-and . . . omitting others
altogether").
108 Cf John 0. McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law, 25 CONST.
COMMENT. 69, 104-05 (2008) (arguing that judges are less susceptible to confirmation bias
than legislators because "[i]f a judge ignores facts in the majority opinion, he will suffer the
embarrassment of a strong dissenter (a factual 'whistleblower') who points out an opinion's

factual flaws").
109 See Nancy J. King & Michael E. O'Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of
Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 212 (2005) (finding that two-thirds of offenders who

plead guilty pursuant to an agreement with the prosecution waive the right to appeal).
110 In the federal system, for example, 87.4% of sentencing appeals are affirmed or
dismissed. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 88, tbl.56.
...
Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Errorin Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the
Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 37 (1990).
112 See Schild, supra note 99, at 133-34 (explaining that use of parameter values in
defining criminal records would discourage judges because of the sheer number of values,
making it difficult to define criminal records).
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keeping data-collection costs manageable and preventing errors that undermine
inter-judge consistency and rationality.
3. RepresentativeInformation About Sentences

Third, to accomplish its goals, the information sharing model depends on
sentencing information that is representative. According to proponents,
information sharing reduces inter-judge disparity and promotes rationality by
giving judges a context or "picture" of how each new case compares to previous
cases.113 Judges can then align their sentences to fit that picture. The trouble is that,
in several ways, the picture can be skewed.
One possibility is that the body of sentencing information may
disproportionately reflect some kinds of cases. Judges, after all, do not choose at
random whether to write a detailed sentencing opinion. Sometimes a judge chooses
to issue a published opinion because the sentence presents a novel legal issue, and
the bulk of the opinion is dedicated to that issue."14 Other times a judge chooses to
issue a published opinion because the case involves extreme or unusual facts or the
sentence imposed may generate controversy." 5 Time constraints not only make it
impossible to prepare a written explanation in every case, but also force judges to
be selective about which sentences warrant extended discussion. Given the choice,
judges often focus on groundbreaking, extreme, or otherwise special cases.
That kind of imbalance, although understandable, presents serious problems
for the information sharing model. A store of sentencing information that consists
disproportionately of extreme or unusual cases is incomplete, and therefore
potentially deceptive, as a guide for judges in ordinary cases. Indeed, it can cause
the information sharing model to backfire. Relying on a skewed body of
information can undermine rationality by creating inconsistency with "invisible"
sentences that did not warrant a published opinion." 6
Another risk is that the body of sentencing information may
disproportionately reflect the work of especially prolific judges. It is no insult to
the judiciary to recognize that different judges have different levels of enthusiasm
for criminal sentencing. Some judges excel at writing sentencing opinions and
Gertner, supra note 4, at 279; Gertner, supra note 73, at 166-67; Sweet et al.,
supra note 5, at 943, 946.
114 E.g., United States v. Pimental, 367 F. Supp. 2d 143, 149-54 (D. Mass. 2005)
(Gertner, J.) (holding that the Sixth Amendment forbids the consideration of acquitted
conduct at sentencing, or alternatively that acquitted conduct may be considered only if it is
found beyond a reasonable doubt).
" E.g., United States v. Haynes, 557 F. Supp. 2d 200 (D. Mass. 2008) (Gertner, J.)
113

(discussing in detail the defendant's life history, employment, training, family
responsibilities, good deeds, and other strong mitigating circumstances).
116 See AUSTIN LOVEGROVE, JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING, SENTENCING POLICY, AND
NUMERICAL GUIDANCE 42 (1989) ("[I]t is acknowledged that there is disparity in

sentencing, and it is important that a few disparate cases should not appear to be the
norm.").
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would eagerly participate in an information-driven inter-judge dialogue, perhaps
earning induction into Professor Doug Berman's "Sentencing Judges Hall of
Fame."' 17 But many others have little patience for sentencing and little inclination
to invest more time in preparing written opinions.' 18 Given the option, some judges
may contribute more and better information than their colleagues.
That poses a problem for the information sharing model because a
nonrepresentative store of sentencing information, dominated by some voices
while others remain silent, can exacerbate inter-judge disparity. Future judges,
guided by a skewed sense of previous sentencing patterns, might inadvertently
misalign their decisions with those of less prolific judges. The risk is particularly
acute if outlier judges contribute more opinions and information than their
colleagues-a plausible scenario, since judges have a special incentive to write a
detailed opinion when they suspect that others may disagree with the outcome.
Initially, then, information collection poses formidable challenges for the
information sharing model. To succeed, the model depends on written,
comprehensive, and representative sentencing information, and generating that
kind of information is time-consuming and costly. As explained below, however,
even if such information were collected, there would be practical difficulties in
making it available to judges.

B. Information Dissemination Challenges
Another set of challenges for the information sharing model relates to the
dissemination of sentencing information. Once collected, information about
previous cases must somehow be made accessible to sentencing judges. Yet,
because sentencing often turns on highly sensitive personal information about
offenders and victims, information sharing raises privacy concerns. In addition,
there are practical hurdles in making relevant sentencing opinions and statistics
accessible to judges.
1. Privacy

Sharing sentencing information with far-flung courts raises serious privacy
concerns. A written sentencing opinion or case record may disclose personal
information about the offender. Sentencing courts frequently rely on the offender's
criminal history, including any juvenile criminal record.l 19 Judges may also
117 Douglas A. Berman, Imagining a "SentencingJudges Hall of Fame,"
SENT'G L. &

POL'Y (Nov. 7, 2004, 8:26 PM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_1aw-and
policy/2004/ 11/a thoughtful-an.html.
"' Bowman, supra note 104, at 356.

119 As an illustration, consider the kind of information contained in presentence
investigation reports presented to federal judges. See OFFICE OF PROB. & PRETRIAL SERVS.,
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, PUB. No. 107, THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION

REPORT, at 111-17 to -24 (2006), available at http://www.fd.org/docs/select-topics--sentencing/the-presentence-investigation-report.pdf?sfvrsn=4.
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consider the offender's medical history, mental health, and physical condition,
which may serve as mitigating factors at sentencing.120 Work history and
opportunities for employment may factor into the offender's prospects for
rehabilitation.12' The court may also discuss the offender's home and family life,
including the offender's performance as a parent, obligation to care for young
children, or support from relatives.12 2 In some cases, mitigating facts at sentencing
include profoundly personal information about the offender, such as a history of

sexual or physical abuse.123
Victims and other third parties also have privacy interests at stake. Sentencing
courts often emphasize the harm caused to victims of crime, which may require a
discussion of physical, psychological, or economic injuries.' 24 Indeed, in some
jurisdictions the victims of crime have a legal right to be heard at sentencing.12 5
Witnesses who testify at sentencing, on behalf of the offender or the government,
sometimes provide personal information and seek to keep their testimony
confidential.12 6 For a host of reasons, evidence at sentencing may be submitted
under seal or considered in camera.127 Yet a written opinion or case record
designed to offer future judges a comprehensive picture of the case must, of
necessity, disclose that information.
Of particular concern is information about cooperation with the government.
Offenders frequently receive a lower sentence because of their assistance to police
or prosecutors, and a written sentencing opinion or case record may indicate the
nature and extent of that cooperation. Sentencing courts may also rely on the
statements of cooperating witnesses who appear at sentencing, at trial, or before a
grand jury. That information is potentially explosive because it may expose the
offender or family members to violence and retaliation. The risk is chillingly real

Id. at 111-25 to -26.
See id. at 111-27 to -29.
122 See id. at 11-3 to -4, 111-25
to -26.
123 See id. at 11-4 (instructing probation officers that "[a] very sensitive
area that may
120
121

need to be addressed is whether the defendant has a history of being physically, sexually,
or emotionally abused"); see also United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 230 (7th Cir.
1989) (discussing facts disclosed in a presentence report, and concluding that "[t]he
criminal defendant has a strong interest in maintaining the confidentiality of [the]
presentence report").
124 OFFICE OF PROB. & PRETRIAL SERVS., supra note 119, at 11-23 to -25,
Ill-11 to -12.
125 See, e.g., Crime Victims' Rights Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 3771
(a)(4) (2006); FED.
R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(B) ("Before imposing sentence, the court must address any victim of
the crime who is present at sentencing and must permit the victim to be reasonably

heard.").
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(3)(B) (excluding from presentence reports certain
sensitive information, including "any sources of information obtained upon a promise of
confidentiality").
127 See id. 32(i)(4)(C) (authorizing courts to hear statements at sentencing in camera
upon a party's motion and "for good cause").
126
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in the Internet age, when websites like Who's a Rat? make it easier than ever to
identify and locate people who cooperate with the government.128
Courts' treatment of presentence reports (PSRs) underscores those privacy
concerns. A PSR is a written document, usually prepared by a member of the court
staff or probation officer, designed to assist the judge at sentencing. In most
jurisdictions, a PSR is prepared as a matter of routine in felony cases.' 29 Like a
written opinion or case record, the PSR may contain personal information about
the offender, victims, family members, or third parties. 130 Recognizing those
privacy interests, courts have a longstanding practice of maintaining the
confidentiality of PSRs.131 Indeed, for decades, it was controversial to disclose the
report even to the offender.' 32 Disclosure to third parties is almost always
forbidden. As one federal judge put it, "I guess L, feel strongly that such
information should not be made accessible to anyone outside the case." 33
Thus, the dissemination of sentencing information to judges raises important
concerns about the privacy of offenders and victims. But the disclosure of sensitive
information is not the only concern. As the next section explains, making any
sentencing information easily accessible for judges may be equally difficult.
2. Accessibility and Relevance

Another challenge in disseminating sentencing information is ensuring that
the relevant information is easily accessible. As noted above, the information
sharing model depends on a pool of information that is written, comprehensive,
and representative.' 34 Beyond that, however, judges also need some way to wade
through the available information and zero in on what is useful. For information
sharing to reduce inter-judge disparity, sentencing judges need a way to find
similar cases, comparing previous sentences with a new set of facts. Only then can
they impose a sentence along the same lines. Likewise, for information sharing to
promote rationality, sentencing judges need to consult the reasoning of other courts
128 See About Us, WHO'S A RAT,

http://www.whosarat.com/aboutus.php (last visited
June 9, 2013).
129 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1)(A) (requiring a presentence investigation and report,
except in a few circumstances).
130 See id. 32(d) (setting forth required contents of federal presentence reports);
OFFICE OF PROB. & PRETRIAL SERVS., supra note 119, at III-1 to -44, (providing guidance
to probation officers responsible for preparing presentence reports).
U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 12 (1988) ("[C]ourts have been very
reluctant to give third parties access to the presentence investigation report prepared for
some other individual or individuals.") (emphasis omitted).
132 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2) advisory committee's note (collecting sources and

describing the "heated controversy" over "whether as a matter of policy the defendant
should be accorded some opportunity to see and refute allegations made in such reports").
133

Ian Urbina, New York's Federal Judges Protest Sentencing Procedures, N.Y.

TIMES, Dec. 8, 2003, at B 1 (quoting Judge Sterling Johnson, Jr.) (discussing disclosure of
sentencing documents to Congress).
134 See supra Part II.A.1-3.
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in relevant cases. Only then can they write an opinion accepting that reasoning or
distinguishing the case, for the benefit of future judges.
Accordingly, a centerpiece of the information sharing model is some
system-an electronic database, a website, or a set of shared files, for examplethat allows sentencing judges to search for previous decisions that are similar and
relevant.1 35 But because of the complexity and volume of sentencing decisions,
there are practical challenges in building such a system, and judges may be
discouraged from making effective use of the available information.
First, the complexity of sentencing decisions complicates the design of any
search system. With a theoretically infinite number of variables in play, no search
form or user interface can capture them all. Instead, the designers of the system of
necessity must select some search parameters to include, while ignoring others. 136
That process is subjective and controversial.
For example, a system might allow judges to search previous sentences based
on the offender's criminal history. But that kind of search could take many forms.
It may be implemented as a yes/no field (i.e., did the offender have any prior
criminal history?). Or it might include two yes/no fields, one for juvenile criminal
history and another for adult criminal history. Or it might include a single scaled
search parameter that captures the total number of prior offenses, the total number
of adult offenses, the total number of violent offenses, or all of the above. Or it
might include search parameters based on age at the time of the offender's first
offense, at the time of the most recent offense, or a hundred other variations. As
the designers of one sentencing information system lamented, "It does not take a
mathematical wizard to realize that if there are even as few as three or four levels
of each of these [criminal history] variables, there are over 700 combinations of
aspects of this one variable-criminal record."l 3 7 One researcher estimates that the
total number of combinations of criminal history parameters alone "would reach
into the tens of thousands."' 3 8 Even the massive datafiles created by the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, which are breathtaking in their complexity, could not
support searches on many of the criminal-history factors described above.,3 9
As discussed below, courts in Missouri and abroad in Canada, Scotland, and
Australia have experimented with providing judges searchable computer databases of
sentencing information. See infra Part III.B..
136 See Miller, supra note 42, at 134; Schild, supra note
99, at 132.
1s

Anthony N. Doob & Norman W. Park, Computerized Sentencing Informationfor
Judges: An Aid to the Sentencing Process, 30 CRIM. L.Q. 54, 62 (1987).
138 Schild, supra note 99, at
133.
137

For criminal history, the datafiles include a yes/no variable, criminal history points
and category scores that indirectly reflect a host of underlying criminal history facts, a
count of "incidents" classified according to level of seriousness, and adjustments for
committing the instant offense while under various forms of court supervision. See U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, VARIABLE CODEBOOK FOR INDIVIDUAL OFFENDERS 7-80 (2010).
The Commission's data do not, however, capture which prior incidents were violent, the
age of the offender at the time of each incident, the time elapsed since each incident, or the
name or type of court that adjudicated the prior incident.
139
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Many other factors relevant at sentencing are equally complex and difficult to
operationalize. The problem is that there is no "right" design. Each variation of
those search parameters is potentially relevant, and different judges may prefer
different options. By picking some limited number for searching and excluding
others altogether, system designers risk alienating judges. Why bother with a
search system that seems focused on all the wrong issues?
Worse, the subjectivity of search parameters can threaten inter-judge
consistency. Suppose, for example, a search system allows judges to search for
cases in which the offender's criminal history included any "violent" prior
offenses. Although judges might broadly agree that violent criminal history is
highly relevant at sentencing, they may disagree about what offenses qualify as
violent or nonviolent. The hypothetical case described above, in which an armed
burglar confronts a homeowner at night but never fires or even brandishes the
firearm, might be a close case. If judges' differing views about what qualifies as
violent are embedded into the search parameters, the system may lock in interjudge disparity by concealing the disagreement from future users.140
Nor would full-text searching of written opinions solve the problem. In other
contexts, judges (and their law clerks) typically find relevant case law using
electronic services like Westlaw and LexisNexis, which offer sophisticated search
tools. 14 1 Flexible as they are, however, those services would have significant
limitations as a means of reliably identifying similar cases. The language that
judges use to describe offense and offender characteristics varies enormously from
opinion to opinion, making it easy for factually similar cases to escape notice.142
Innovations in electronic discovery, such as predictive coding, hold out some
promise as lower-cost and higher-accuracy alternatives to traditional keyword
searches.143 But for now, those techniques remain prohibitively costly and timeconsuming for routine use in sentencing decisions.
Uri Schild acknowledges this difficulty, but maintains that it is "not really a
problem" because users are interested only in whether the judge thought the offense was
violent (or serious or aberrant) and "passed sentence accordingly." Schild, supra note 99, at
133. The nature of the offense "objectively speaking" does not matter. Id. He is mistaken.
The whole point of reducing inter-judge disparity is to ensure that objectively similar
offenders receive equivalent sentences.
140

141

Peter W. Martin, Reconfiguring Law Reports and the Concept of Precedentfor a

DigitalAge, 53 VILL. L. REv. 1, 38-39 (2008). Notably, however, not all state trial courts
can afford subscriptions to those services, leaving judges to either rely on the parties or to
conduct research using more traditional and less flexible methods. Id. at 27.
142 As a thought experiment, try to devise a search of written opinions that would
capture all sentences in which the offender's criminal history included a violent crime. The
terms "violent" or "violence" would not necessarily appear in the opinion, and the possible
synonyms are endless: "armed," "weapon," "firearm," "'gun," ''knife'' ".attack,""brandish,"
and dozens of others. Picking out the relevant results would be time-consuming, and could
never uarantee that all relevant cases had been discovered.
Adam M. Acosta, Predictive Coding: The Beginning of a New E-Discovery Era,
56 REs GESTAE 8, 8 (2012). Predictive coding "uses a combination of sophisticated
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Second, the volume of sentencing decisions makes the search for similar cases
difficult. 'If the system provides too few search parameters, judges may discover
that an overwhelming number of cases seem relevant. 145 At a high level of
generality, each case may be similar to hundreds or even thousands of others.14 6
Given their time constraints, sentencing judges cannot carefully review so many
potentially relevant cases. 14 7 Presented with a daunting volume of matches, judges
may give.up.
If, on the other hand, the system provides too many search parameters, then
searches frequently will yield no results. In sentencing, no two cases are exactly
alike-any more than two human beings are exactly alike. Indeed, a key premise
of the information sharing model is that judges can develop more rational
sentencing law by offering principled reasons to distinguish between dissimilar
cases. As a practical matter, however, judges who search for matching cases and
constantly come up empty may conclude that the exercise is a waste of time. This
level-of-generality problem should not be overstated; as diligent legal researchers
know, if one search returns ten thousand results and the next returns zero,
continuing to refine the search parameters can make the results manageable.
Nonetheless, the volume of sentences creates special challenges in making relevant
results readily accessible to judges.
The volume of sentencing decisions also can threaten the accuracy and
usefulness of the information. The information sharing model anticipates that
sentencing judges will serve both as producers and consumers of information. In
that sense, all judges are interdependent, relying on one another to make
contributions to a central pool of information. For some judges, however, a
crushing case load or other time constraints may result in errors or hurried and
unhelpful written explanations. In turn, that inaccurate or inadequate information
can frustrate others, who will find the system less useful. A vicious cycle is
algorithms, issue tags and keyword searches" to search a large volume of electronic
documents based on human reviewers' categorization of a small number of documents. Id.
144 Id. (noting that, as a first step in predictive coding, "only a few thousand
documents need to be reviewed" to prepare a "seed set" of documents that serves as a basis
for subsequent searches); id. at 8-9 (discussing the costs, in attorney time, of document
review to support predictive coding).
145 Schild, supra note 99, at 134.
146 Cf David C. Blair & M.E. Maron, An Evaluation of Retrieval Effectiveness for a
Full-Text Document-Retrieval System, 28 COMMC'NS ACM 289, 297-98 (1985)
(discussing shortcomings of keyword searches of a full-text document-retrieval system
designed by lawyers to identify relevant documents from a pool of forty thousand
electronic documents involved in litigation).
Cf Lewis A. Komhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team:
Hierarchy and Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1623 (1995)
147

(discussing the cost advantages of limiting the number of precedents a trial judge must
consult); Stith, supra note 111, at 20 (noting that trial courts cannot engage in the "costly,
complex" process of reviewing all relevant appellate precedent on a particular legal issue,
and therefore may "reduce its costs ... by considering only a subset of relevant appellate
decisions").
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possible, as everyone begins to doubt that painstaking accuracy and thoughtful
opinions will actually benefit their colleagues. As computer programmers say,
"garbage in, garbage out."
In summary, the complexity and volume of sentencing decisions create
serious challenges in disseminating sentencing information and making it
accessible to judges. It is therefore naive to expect that making sentencing
information available to other judges will, in the words of Judge Sweet, "almost
automatically" provide "a firmament of reference points and a body of reasoning"
that can "alleviat[e] unwarranted disparity" between judges. 148 Making relevant
sentencing information accessible to judges is anything but automatic.
There are further challenges, however, even assuming that the right kind of
sentencing information can be collected and disseminated. As explained below, the
critical final step involves how judges make use of the information.

C. Voluntariness Challenges
Assuming that written, comprehensive, and representative information has
been collected, and the relevant information is accessible, the information sharing
model predicts that judges will seek out that information and treat it as persuasive,
perhaps even authoritative. By design, the model is voluntary, leaving sentencing
judges free to decide whether and how to consult information about previous cases.
The idea is not to constrain judges, but to assist them in the exercise of "fully
informed discretion."1 49 Information sharing will reduce inter-judge disparity and
promote rationality, the argument goes, because judges who otherwise would have
reached a contrary result will instead conform their sentences to those of their
colleagues.
The unspoken assumption of the model is that the primary source of interjudge disparity and irrationality is ignorance. According to this view, judges
broadly agree about sentencing, and they reach inconsistent results only because
they lack information about how other courts have handled similar cases.
Therefore, "sentencing disparity would virtually disappear if judges had access to
data about their colleagues' decisions." 5 0
That premise is unrealistic. Inter-judge disparity results.not merely from a
lack of information, but from deep disagreements about sentencing values and
priorities. Surveys of judges, for example, have revealed persistent differences of
opinion about important sentencing principles and policies.'5 1 Judges are
148 Sweet et al., supra note 5, at 943, 946.
149 MO. SENTENCING ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 57, at 11-13; Wolff, supra note

2, at 97:
150 Zenoff, supra note 19, at 1451 (describing the view of some observers).
151 See, e.g., LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SURVEY OF
ARTICLE III JUDGES ON THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, at ES-1 to -5 (2003),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research/ResearchProjects/Surveys/200303_Judge

Survey/jsfull.pdf (reporting disagreements about how well the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
accomplish purposes of punishment set out by Congress); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
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particularly divided, for example, on hot-button criminal justice topics like child
pornography, drug trafficking, and white-collar fraud.152 Prior research on
sentencing in the federal system has documented a sharp spike in inter-judge
disparity following the shift from mandatory to advisory guidelines,15 3 despite the
absence of any changes in judges' access to sentencing information. Other research
reveals significant differences in sentencing outcomes between Democratic and
Republican appointees. 154 In light of those basic disagreements, it is unrealistic to
expect that sentencing judges in a voluntary system will dutifully fall into line
when supplied with information about their colleagues' decisions.
Instead, when judges disagree in good faith with the actions of their
colleagues, there is every reason to believe they will disregard the information and
impose a sentence they believe is just and appropriate. The result will be persistent
inter-judge disparity. It is possible that, over time, voluntary information sharing
could foster a dialogue between judges that resolves the disagreement, as courts
settle on one view or the other. But it is equally possible that the disagreement will
continue, with dueling courts committed to opposing views. A purely voluntary
model is powerless to correct that problem.15 1
Disregarding the information, moreover, is not the only alternative to falling
in line with other judges' decisions. Consider three other possibilities. First, judges
can avoid discovering the information in the first place. When judges know or
suspect that their preferred sentence is out of step with that of their colleagues,
nothing in a voluntary system prevents them from simply ignoring the available
information. Such a "see no evil, hear no evil" impulse would thwart the
information sharing model in precisely those cases where it could be most useful.
Second, judges can keep looking. Upon discovering information about past
sentences that run contrary to their own preferences, they can continue to mine the
available opinions in search of more favorable results. Behavioral literature on
confirmation bias has documented similar cognitive errors in other contexts.
Confirmation bias describes the tendency to unwittingly select and interpret
evidence in a manner that confirms a previously held belief or hypothesis, while

RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES JANUARY
MARCH 2010 tbl.8 (2010) (same).
152 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supranote 151, tbl.8.
153
154

2010

THROUGH

Scott, supra note 16, at 30-41.
Joshua B. Fischman & Max M. Schanzenbach, Do Standards of Review Matter?

The Case ofFederalCriminalSentencing, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 431 (2011).
155 Cf Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional
Law at Cross-Purposes, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1114 (2005) (arguing that advisory

sentencing guidelines, as a form of voluntary advice to sentencing judges, are "by
definition unenforceable" and provide "no systemic remedy for outlier sentences").
See Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in
Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 189-97 (1998) (discussing confirmation bias in
156

number mysticism, witch hunts, policy making, medicine, science, and judicial reasoning).
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minimizing or failing to recognize contrary evidence.157 Previous research has
documented confirmation bias among prosecutors, police, and jurors, 58 and the
same tendency undoubtedly exists among judges.159
Although concerns about cognitive errors like confirmation bias should not be
overstated, 160 the complexity of sentencing decisions creates conditions that may
facilitate confirmation bias. At a high level of generality, many offenses and
offenders share common characteristics, providing judges with a wealth of
"confirming" data points that may reinforce their intuitions. Yet in the details,
sentences are as infinitely variable as human beings,161 allowing courts to draw
infinite distinctions that minimize the importance of "disconfirming" data points.
Third, judges can become even more polarized. Judges confronted with
information about previous sentencing patterns may not only reject their
colleagues' approach, but may also stake out an even more extreme position. That
kind of attitude polarization effect finds some support in psychology literature as
well.162 In a seminal study, for example, test subjects who held opposing views
' Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in
Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 291, 309, 313 ("[S]tudies show that, in some
circumstances, people do not respond to information at variance with their beliefs by
simply ignoring it, but rather by working hard to examine it critically so as to undermine
it."); Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 121 n.26
(2007) ("'[C]onfirmation bias' . . . refers to the tendency of persons to seek out and assign
more weight to evidence that confirms a prior belief or hypothesis than to evidence
disconfirming it.").
158 See, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: ProsecutorialResistance to PostConviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 129 (2004) (prosecutors); Barbara
O'Brien, Prime Suspect: An Examination of Factors that Aggravate and Counteract
Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 315, 318
(2009) (police); Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of CircumstantialEvidence,
105 MICH. L. REv. 241, 292-94 (2006) (juries).
159 See David E. Klein, Unspoken Questions in the Rule 32.1 Debate: Precedent and
Psychology in Judging, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1709, 1717-18 (2005) ("[J]udges are
human, and it is hard to imagine that they escape all the cognitive pitfalls that other people
stumble into."); McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 108, at 104-05 (comparing confirmation
bias between the judicial and legislative branches).
160 Judges usually explain their sentencing decisions in public, and in most
jurisdictions the parties can challenge the sentence on appeal. That kind of accountability is
often effective in counteracting cognitive biases. See Klein, supra note 159, at 1718
(observing that "the typical judging experience" involves "the conditions under which
accountability has the best chance of reducing cognitive errors"); Jennifer S. Lerner &
Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255,
259, 263 (1999).
161 See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying
text.
162 See Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization:
The
Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979) (concluding that polarization may result when individuals who
"hold strong opinion[s] on complex social issues," such as the death penalty, are exposed to
empirical evidence).
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about capital punishment grew more polarized after reading identical information
about conflicting research on the deterrent effect of the death penalty.' 63 As
Professor Cass Sunstein explains, at least when people begin with strongly held
views, a "balanced presentation[]" in which "competing arguments or positions are
laid out side by side" is likely to increase rather than reduce attitude
polarization.'" Information sharing, in other words, does not inevitably result in
agreement and uniformity. To the contrary, in some circumstances it can harden
individuals' resolve and make disagreements more pronounced.
Conceptually, then, the information sharing model suffers from several
fundamental weaknesses in promoting inter-judge consistency and uniformity at
sentencing. The collection of sentencing information is challenging because of the
need for written, comprehensive, and representative opinions. The dissemination of
that information is challenging because of the complexity and volume of
sentencing decisions. And the voluntariness of the model leaves judges free to
ignore or disregard the information.
III. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON SENTENCING INFORMATION SHARING
These challenges are not merely speculative. New and existing empirical
research tends to confirm the fundamental weaknesses of the information sharing
model. This Part first reports the results of an original study of federal sentencing
data collection. It then examines the history of two reform efforts grounded in the
information sharing model, sentencing information systems and sentencing
councils. Collectively, the research reinforces the serious challenges related to
information collection, information dissemination, and voluntariness.

A. An Empirical Study of the Collection of Sentencing Information
Despite strong support for the information sharing model, to my knowledge
no previous empirical research has examined the collection of sentencing
information. As explained above, the information sharing model depends on a
store of sentencing information that is written, comprehensive, and representative.
Promoting rationality in sentencing decisions requires thoughtful and principled
explanations and a continuing dialogue between judges, which is impossible
without written sentencing opinions.' 65 Likewise, comprehensive and
representative information is crucial, since a skewed body of previous decisions

Id. at 2100-05. But see Arthur G. Miller et al., The Attitude Polarization
Phenomenon: Role of Response Measure, Attitude Extremity, and Behavioral
Consequences of Reported Attitude Change, 64 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 561,
561-69 (1993) (replicating the Lord study and finding no attitude polarization when
163

subjects reported their views immediately before reviewing the dueling studies).
Cass R. Sunstein, Breaking Up the Echo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2012, at A25.
165 See supra Part II.A.1.
164
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can actually deepen inter-judge disparity.166 No study has tested the feasibility of
that kind of information collection.
To fill that gap, this Article reports the results of an original study of the
collection of sentencing information. Drawing on a unique dataset of sentencing
documents from a federal district court, the study evaluates the quantity and
characteristics of written sentence explanations submitted pursuant to mandatory
reporting requirements. Because the documents that form the basis for the analysis
are generally nonpublic, the analysis is the first of its kind.
1. Data and Coding

The study is based on a key federal sentencing document called the Statement
of Reasons. In federal court, sentencing judges must complete. a Statement of
Reasons in connection with every criminal sentence.' 6 7 Upon completion, the
document is transmitted to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which extracts and
records data about the sentence. 168 The Commission then generates massive
datafiles, based on the contents of tens of thousands of documents each year, to
serve as the basis for statistical reports about nationwide sentencing practices. To
ensure that complete and comprehensive data are available, the chief judge of
every federal district court is required by statute to "ensure" that in every case a
"written statement of reasons for the sentence imposed" is submitted in a format
specified by the Commission.169
To understand how the Statement of Reasons works, a brief summary of
federal sentencing practice may be helpful. The U.S. Sentencing Commission has
promulgated detailed sentencing guidelines that translate offense and offender
characteristics into a sentencing range, expressed as a narrow range of months of
imprisonment (such as 52-63 months). The guideline range is "advisory," 70
meaning that judges must consider the advisory guideline range in every case, but
they are free to impose any reasonable sentence consistent with a laundry-list
statute that sets out broad purposes of punishment. 1 Within-range sentences
reflect the sentencing court's judgment that the guideline range is proper for the
"mine-run" of similar cases, and that the particular offense and offender are "not
different enough to warrant a different sentence." 72
The Statement of Reasons form is adapted to the guidelines regime. It is four
pages long and requires that judges provide basic information about the sentence

166
167

See supra Part II.A.2-3.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) ("The court shall provide a

transcription or other appropriate public record of the court's statement of reasons, together
with the
6 order of judgment and commitment .. . to the Sentencing Commission . ...
I 8 id.
,
169 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)(1), (w)(1)(B) (2006).
170 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
"'
172

Id.

Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 359 (2007).
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imposed. 173 Judges must check a box indicating whether the sentence falls within,
above, or below the advisory guideline range. They also have the option of
checking boxes that correspond to reasons for an out-of-guidelines sentence. 174 The
checkboxes express the reasons for the sentence in very general terms, such as
"aggravating or mitigating circumstances" or "the nature and circumstances of the
offense."l 75
Most relevant for present purposes, the form provides several spaces in which
judges may provide a narrative description of the reasons for the sentence. 176 The
form states that a written narrative description is required in two categories of
cases: (1) all sentences outside the guideline range, and (2) all sentences within the
guideline range that carry a term of imprisonment of "greater than 24 months." 7
Judges sometimes use the back of the form or attach additional pages or
documents, such as a written sentencing opinion or a transcript of the sentencing
hearing.
The Statement of Reasons form is usually secret and confidential, pursuant to
a policy statement issued by the Judicial Conference of the United States.178 But
one federal district court, the District of Massachusetts, has voted to make
Statements of Reasons available to the public on the PACER system (Public
Access to Court Electronic Records).17 9 That decision affords a rare opportunity to
study sentencing practices that remain hidden in every other federal court. The
open-access policy reflects the court's admirable commitment to greater
transparency in criminal sentencing. 8 0

n ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FORM No. AO 245B, JUDGMENT IN A
CRIMINAL CASE attachment (rev. ed. 2011) (Statement of Reasons) [hereinafter
STATEMENT OF REASONS FORM],
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/

FormsAndFees/Forms/A0245B.pdf; e.g., Judgment in a Criminal Case at 7-10, United
States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-CR-10299 (D. Mass Feb. 24, 2010).
1' STATEMENT OF REASONS FORM, supra note 173, at 2-3.
'
Id. The checkboxes correspond to the titles of guideline departures, see U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines §§ 5K2.0, 5K2.13 (2011), and broad purposes of punishment, see 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006). The checkboxes themselves provide no information about the
particular case. Judges can check a box marked "Age," for example, but the checkbox does
not indicate whether the offender was young or old.
176 STATEMENT OF REASONS FORM, supra note 173, at 2 ("Explain the facts justifying
the departure."); id. at 3 ("Explain the facts justifying a sentence outside the advisory
guideline system."); id. at 4 ("Additional facts justifying the sentence in this case...
In See id. at 2, 4.
17 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 17 (2001).

179 See United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 277 n.66 (D. Mass. 2004)
(Young, C.J.) (citing Minutes of the Court Meeting of the District of Massachusetts 4
(Sept. 4, 2001)).
180 See United States v. Kandirakis, 441 F. Supp. 2d 282, 332-33 n.76 (D. Mass.

2006).
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To assess the kind of information collected using the Statement of Reasons,
the study examines a full year (fiscal year 2006181) of cases from the District of
Massachusetts. A total of 411 statements were reviewed and coded, representing
approximately 80% of the Statements of Reasons submitted to the Commission
that year.1 82 Details concerning document selection are set forth in the Appendix.
Of particular interest is whether the Statements of Reasons supply the kind of
written, comprehensive, and representative explanations necessary to support an
effective information sharing model. 183 Accordingly, the study examines the length
of any written statement explaining the judge's reasons, measured by the number
of sentences of text contained in the narrative description. Such a sentence count
admittedly captures only the length, and not the quality, of the written explanation.
But the length of the narrative description is a fairly reliable proxy for the level of
factual detail and the thoroughness of the judge's reasoning. The study classifies a
narrative description of one to three sentences as a short explanation. It classifies a
narrative description of four to nine sentences, at least a paragraph but less than a
page, as a medium explanation. It classifies a narrative description of ten or more
sentences of text, roughly one page, as a long explanation.
2. Results

The results are discouraging. As shown in Figure 1, even in cases where a
written explanation of the reasons for the sentence is mandatory,184 most
Statements of Reasons contain no written explanation at all. Only a small fraction
of the documents contain a comprehensive explanation.

1 The analysis includes Statements of Reasons filed in the Commission's 2006 fiscal
year, which runs from October 1, 2005, to September 30, 2006.
182 See infra Appendix Part A.

See supra notes 95-118 and accompanying text (explaining why the information
sharing model depends on written sentencing opinions, comprehensive with respect to
potentially relevant facts and representative of similar cases in the jurisdiction).
183

184 See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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Figure 1: Explanation Provided, Where Written Explanation is Mandatory,
District of Massachusetts, FY 2006 (n = 317)
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For cases in which a written narrative description is required, the Statement of
Reasons contains no indication whatsoever of the judge's reasons in 48.6% of
cases. 18 5 In another 9. 1% of cases, the only indication of the judge's reasons is a
checkmark in a box corresponding to a broad reason for the decision (such as
"aggravating or mitigating factors" or "the circumstances of the offense").
Together, that means that in 57.7% of cases-more than half-the document
contains no written narrative description, despite the Commission's reporting
requirements. Such a low rate of written explanations is a major obstacle for the
information sharing model, given the importance of written opinions in fostering a
dialogue between sentencing courts, and thereby promoting rationality in
sentencing law.' 86

185 As discussed infra, the percentage of sentences with no written explanation is
much lower for nonguideline sentences (28.6%) than for within-range sentences of more
than twenty-four months (78.7%). But because a written explanation is mandatory in both
circumstances, Figure I reports the level of explanation for both categories combined.

186 See supra Part II.A.1. Checkmarks indicating only a general topic area are

insufficient to promote inter-judge consistency and rationality. See United States v.
Blackie, 548 F.3d 395, 401 (6th Cir. 2008) (vacating sentence for lack of an adequate
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Nor are the available written explanations comprehensive. In 27.1% of cases,
the document provides only a short narrative explanation of up to three sentences
of text, and in another 9.1% of cases it provides a medium-length explanation of
four to nine sentences. That kind of quick summary represents an improvement
over a checklist, but it would be of little use to future courts drawing upon that
information to develop a rational body of sentencing law. The explanation can
highlight a few factors that the judge deemed most important, but of necessity
many relevant facts must be omitted, and there can be room for only a bare-bones
explanation of how the judge weighed the competing facts and considerations.
Short-shrift explanations pose a problem for the information sharing model
because incomplete opinions may fail to capture facts that future judges deem
important, masking important similarities or differences between cases and thereby
generating inter-judge disparity and undermining rationality.' 87
There is some good news. In a small number of cases (6.0%), the judge
provided a long written explanation consisting of at least ten sentences of text.
Indeed, in a tiny subset of cases (1.1% of the total), the judge wrote a formal
sentencing opinion or attached a hearing transcript that includes more than fifty
sentences of explanation. Those opinions are outstanding, offering future judges
not only a full sense of the relevant facts, but also valuable insights into the
sentencing judge's reasons and approach.
Unfortunately, those cases tend to be unusual, resulting in a nonrepresentative
body of long written opinions. As shown in Figure 2, sentences outside the
guideline range are more likely to produce a long explanation than sentences
within the guideline range.

explanation because court merely checked boxes indicating reasons for the sentence,
without discussing any facts related to the offense or offender).
187

See supra Part II.A.2.
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Figure 2: Long Explanation Provided, By Guideline Range,
District of Massachusetts, FY 2006 (n = 411)
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Figure 2 illustrates the percentage of cases in which the Statement of Reasons
contains a long explanation, consisting of ten sentences of text or more, across
three categories: sentences within the guideline range, sentences above the
guideline range, and sentences below the guideline range. For sentences within the
advisory guideline range, judges provided a long explanation in just 2.5% of cases.
But for sentences outside that range-those different from the "mine-run" of
likelihood of a long explanation is roughly four times greater.
similar cases 1-the
The documents contain a long explanation for 9.9% of below-range sentences and
for 8.3% of above-range sentences. The result is a skewed collection of long
written descriptions.' 89 A store of sentencing information that consists
disproportionately of unusual or extreme cases poses a real threat to the

188 In theory, a judge is free to impose a nonguideline sentence even in an "ordinary"
case based on policy-driven disagreement with the guideline range. Kimbrough v. United
States, 552 U.S. 85, 108-09 (2007). That is exceedingly rare, however; sentencing courts
overwhelmingly justify their nonguideline sentences based on the special facts of the case.
189 By way of comparison, in the full set of 411 sentences, 67% are within-range
sentences. In the subset of 20 sentences with a long explanation, however, just 35% are
within-range sentences.
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information sharing model, since a skewed backdrop may mislead judges about
sentencing patterns in cases that are ordinary, but effectively invisible.190
The pool of long written explanations is nonrepresentative in another way.
Some judges were far less likely to provide full explanations than others. Figure 3
shows, for each judge, the percentage of that judge's cases in which the Statement
of Reasons contains a long written explanation.'91
Figure 3: Percentage of Cases with Long Explanation, By Judge,
Minimum Caseload Required (13 judges total),
District of Massachusetts, FY 2006
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Not all judges wrote long explanations of their sentences at equal rates.1 92 Six
of the thirteen judges did not submit any long explanations during the year of the
study. By contrast, one judge provided a long explanation for 21.1% of sentences,
and another provided a long explanation for 33.3% of sentences.

190 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.

191 Figure 3 reflects data only for judges with a criminal caseload of at least fifteen
sentences during the year of the study. For further discussion of the minimum-caseload
requirement, see infra Appendix Part B.
192 In this table and throughout, this Article uses numbers rather than
names to
identify individual judges. See Scott, supra note 6, at 173.
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As a result, the pool of sentences with long written explanations is
imbalanced, with some judges far better represented than their colleagues. Judge
13 singlehandedly accounts for 45% of long opinions submitted the year of the
study. That is more than Judges 1 through 10 combined. Together the court's three
most prolific authors of long opinions account for 80% of the court's output of
long written explanations. A body of sentencing information in which some judges
have a dominant voice, while others remain silent, can exacerbate inter-judge
disparity and undermine rationality by creating a distorted impression of actual
sentencing patterns. 19 3
Those differences are not the product of chance. As set forth in the Appendix,
logistic regression models confirm that the pool of written explanations is
significantly imbalanced.19 4 First, some judges and some kinds of cases are more
likely to produce a written explanation than others. Nonguideline sentences are
significantly and strongly correlated with written explanations (b = 3.320,
p < .001). Likewise, longer terms of imprisonment are significantly, although more
weakly, correlated with written explanations (b = 0.007, p = .001). Categorical
variables capturing the identity of the sentencing judge are also a significant
predictor of whether a written explanation is provided (p = .001). Surprisingly,
however, the fact that a written explanation is mandatory is not itself a significant
predictor of a written explanation, after controlling for other factors (b = 0.719,
p .214).195
Second, some kinds of cases are more likely than others to produce a long
written explanation consisting of ten or more sentences of text. Nonguideline
sentences are significantly correlated with long explanations (b = 1.086, p = .037).
Neither sentence length (b = -0.003, p = .482) nor the fact that a written

explanation is mandatory (b = 1.338, p = .234), however, is a statistically
significant predictor of a long explanation. 196
3. Implications

These findings suggest that challenges in collecting written, comprehensive,
and representative sentencing information are formidable. Even in a regime of
detailed and mandatory reporting requirements, backed by a federal statute, the
available pool of written sentencing opinions is limited.
For three reasons, however, these results should be interpreted with caution.
First, Statements of Reasons are not designed as a way for judges to share
information with one another. At present, their sole audience is the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, which uses the documents as inputs for its statistical
reports. No one else has access to the judge's statements, no matter how insightful
See supra Part II.A.3.
194 For more information about variables used in the regression models, see infra
193

Appendix Part B.
195

196

See infra Appendix Part C and Table 1.
See infra Appendix Part C and Table 2.
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or well reasoned'9 7 and judges know it. They therefore have little incentive (aside
from the commands of federal lawl 98) to explain their decisions in detail. Data
collection efforts surely would improve if judges believed that their written
explanations would reach a wider audience.
Second, the Statement of Reasons form itself is clumsy and cumbersome.
Scarcely concealing its intended use as a data-entry tool for the Commission, it
consists primarily of a "parade of nearly meaningless check boxes." 99 That format
no doubt discourages judges from providing more thorough narrative descriptions
of the reasons for a sentence. 200 With a more open-ended form that encouraged
judges to set out their reasons, the contents of the statements might be richer and
more useful.
Third, this study examines documents from a single federal district court.
Data collection practices in one district may not be representative of practices in
other federal courts nationwide or in state courts responsible for the vast majority
of criminal sentences. And the District of Massachusetts, admittedly, is far from
ordinary when it comes to sentencing issues. Several members of the court are well
respected as sentencing experts. Judges Nancy Gertner and William Young have
written scholarly articles on sentencing issues,201 and Judge Patti Saris now serves
as Chair of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. 202 Moreover, the same commitment
to transparency that led the District of Massachusetts to approve its unique
disclosure policy might make its data reporting practices materially different from
those of other courts.
On the other hand, because of the distinctive features of the District of
Massachusetts, this study likely underestimates the challenges in collecting highquality sentencing information. Unlike other courts, the District of Massachusetts
has consciously chosen to make its Statements of Reasons widely available. The
judges know that their reasons will not simply be filed away in a drawer, but
ordinarily will be accessible to the public. If anything, the court's special interest
in sentencing likely translates into more frequent and more thorough written
opinions, not less. In addition, federal judges enjoy a larger support staff, more law
clerks, and a slower criminal docket than their counterparts in state courts.20 3 If the
197 Bruce Green, Thinking About White-Collar Crime and Punishment, CRIM. JUST.

Fall 2010, at 1, 58.
198 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)(1) (2006) (requiring that the chief judge of each federal
district court ensure the completion of a Statement of Reasons in whatever format the
Commission specifies).
199 Chanenson, supra note 98, at 147.
200 id.

201 See, e.g., Gertner, supra note 4; William G. Young, An Open Letter to U.S.
DistrictJudges, FED. LAW., July 2003, at 30.
202 She has written scholarly articles on sentencing as well. See, e.g., Patti B. Saris,
Below the Radar Screens: Have the Sentencing Guidelines Eliminated Disparity? One
Judge's Perspective,30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1027 (1997).
203 Although some federal courts are deluged with criminal immigration cases,

prompting the development of "fast track" disposition programs, the District of
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collection of sentencing information is inadequate in the District of
Massachusetts-widely recognized as one of the best sentencing courts in the
country-then it is probably even worse elsewhere.
The study thus reinforces the idea that information collection challenges are
substantial. Despite explicit reporting requirements, sentencing courts face time
pressures and other constraints that prevent them from routinely providing written,
comprehensive, and representative information.

B. Research on PreviousReform Efforts
In addition to this original research, insights about the information sharing
model can be derived from the experiences of previous sentencing reform efforts
grounded in information sharing. Two efforts are particularly salient:
(1) sentencing information systems (searchable computer databases of sentencing
information constructed in a handful of jurisdictions around the world), and
(2) sentencing councils (periodic roundtable discussions of sentencing among
judges on the same court). The struggles of those reform efforts, and their
occasional successes, underscore serious challenges with information
dissemination and voluntariness.
1. Sentencing Information Systems

In the last twenty-five years, a handful of jurisdictions worldwide have
experimented with sentencing information systems (SISs), which are searchable
electronic databases of sentencing information. Courts in Canada, Scotland,
Ireland, and Australia have launched large-scale experiments with SISs. 20 4 In the
United States, Missouri has constructed a web-based system that could be
described as an SIS. 20 5 Although their designs vary, SISs are designed to enable
judges to look up statistics, case summaries, written opinions, or other information
about previous sentences in similar cases.20 6 Using interactive search forms, a
judge preparing to impose sentence enters some key characteristics of the case.
The SIS responds by reporting information about matching cases. Some systems
provide only aggregated information about whole categories of cases, such as the
distribution of nationwide sentences for aggravated theft. Others provide specific
information about individual cases, such as the case summary or full sentencing
opinion in a relevant case.207
Massachusetts had no such program at the time of the study. See U.S. SENTENCING
SENTENCING STATISTICS 211 (1lth ed. 2006)
(reporting no departures imposed pursuant to an "early disposition program").
204 Miller, supra note 42, at 129; Coulter, supra
note 7, at 4.
205 Wolff, supra note 2, at 101-03.
206 Miller, supra note 42, at 129.
CoMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL

See Ivan Potas et al., Informing the Discretion: The Sentencing Information System
of the Judicial Commission of New South Wales, 6 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 99, 108-11
207

(1998) (describing the New South Wales SIS, complete with pictures of the user interface).
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The primary goals of an SIS, in the jurisdictions that have adopted them, are
to reduce inter-judge sentencing disparity and to promote rationality. 208 When a
judge sentences an offender, an SIS can provide a statistical picture of how similar
offenders have been sentenced by other judges in the same court, region, or
nation.209 Making better information available to judges, the argument goes, makes
it possible for judges to align their decisions with those of their colleagues, and
thus produces more consistent and better-reasoned sentences.2 10
Surprisingly, to date no empirical research has examined whether any SIS has
succeeded in reducing inter-judge sentencing disparity.2 1 1 The indirect evidence,
however, is disheartening. As explained below, many of the most prominent SISs
in foreign courts have been abandoned. Further, in jurisdictions where SISs have
survived, they have taken on .more of a support role following the implementation
of other structured sentencing reforms. Consider the experiences of the three most
prominent SISs, launched in Canada, Scotland, and New South Wales, Australia.
In Canada, four provinces experimented with SISs in the late 1980s. 2 12 A
national sentencing commission had concluded that "detailed information on
current practices" would prove valuable to sentencing judges, 213 and surveys of
judges had revealed a widespread appetite for better information about past
sentencing outcomes.2 14 Although judges were not required to search the Canadian
SIS when imposing sentence, the designers worked closely with judges to design
useful and relevant search parameters. 2 15

Austin Lovegrove, Statistical Information Systems as a Means to Consistency and
Rationality in Sentencing, 7 INT'L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 31, 32 (1999) ("The primary aim of
208

these systems is to promote consistency and rationality-the idea is that cases described by
similar relevant offence characteristics and offender circumstances should receive similar
sentences.").
209 Miller, supra note 42, at 129.
210

Id.

at

135;

SENTENCING

COMM'N

FOR SCOT.,

THE SCOPE

TO

IMPROVE

CONSISTENCY IN SENTENCING para. 8.22, at 36 (2006) ("[SISs] can be used to inform

sentencing decision making and increase consistency within and between sentencers.").
211 See Miller, supra note 42, at 133-34 (recognizing that current systems have not
been subjected to rigorous analysis and evaluation); Schild, supra note 99, at 127. The
courts that have experimented with SISs apparently do not capture and publicize the kind
of data necessary to support such research. See Arie Freiberg, Australia: Exercising
Discretion in Sentencing Policy and Practice,22 FED. SENT'G REP. 204, 206 (2010). As a

result there is no direct evidence that the availability of an SIS improves inter-judge
consistency.
212 See generally Doob & Park, supra note 137, at 54 (analyzing the development of

SISs for judges in Canada).
213 CANADIAN SENTENCING COMM'N, SENTENCING REFORM: A CANADIAN APPROACH

61 (1987).
214 See Doob & Park, supra note 137, at 55 (noting that 79% of the 414 responding
judges believed that better information about past sentences would be helpful).
215 See Miller, supra note 42, at 130.
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It did not work. Within a few years, the Canadian SIS experiment was
abandoned because judges declined to use it.216 The system's architect attributed
its demise to the fact that the reform was strictly voluntary. He was surprised to
discover that "[j]udges do not, as a rule, care to know what sentences other judges
are handing down in comparable cases."217 Judges were especially reluctant to use
the system, he reported, "if they knew (or thought) that these other judges [had]
different approaches" than their own.2 18
Similarly, in Scotland, an SIS was developed for judges of the High Court of
Justiciary, which handles sentencing for some of the nation's most serious criminal
offenses. Following a trial period in 1997, the SIS became available to all of the
court's judges in 2002. Judges themselves proposed developing the system,
principally as a defensive measure to head off more intrusive reforms (such as
presumptive sentencing guidelines) that would have sharply limited their
discretion. 2 19 As in Canada, judges worked closely with designers of the SIS to
define the available search parameters. 220 The result, according to its creators, was
a highly flexible and valuable resource.221
Yet the Scottish SIS collapsed as well. In 2006, just a few years after the
system became widely available, the Sentencing Commission of Scotland reported
that the system "was not widely used" and had "largely fallen into abeyance."222
Judges rarely used the system to gather information, and rarely took the time to
enter narrative information concerning their own sentencing decisions. 22 3 The data
were also incomplete and at times inaccurate.224 The Commission found that
"currently the SIS does not have anything other than the most marginal of impacts
on the imposition of sentences."22 5 In 2010, one of the designers of the system
proclaimed that the SIS is essentially nonoperational, having been "allowed to
atrophy" following years ofjudicial neglect.2 26
The Australian state of New South Wales boasts the world's most successful
SIS, at least measured by longevity. The Judicial Commission of New South
216

Id.
Id. (quoting Anthony Doob, Sentencing Aids: Final Report 5 (1989) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
218 Id. at 130-31 (quoting Anthony Doob, Sentencing Aids: Final Report
10 (1989)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
219 See Hutton & Tata, supra note 83,
at 275.
220 SENTENCING COMM'N FOR SCOT., supra note 210, para.
8.23, at 36.
221 See Neil Hutton & Cyrus Tata, Sentencing Reform by Self-Regulation: Present
and
Future Prospects of the Sentencing Information System for Scotland's High Court of
Justiciary,6 SCOT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 37, 44 (2000); Cyrus Tata, 'Neutrality', 'Choice', and
'Ownership' in the Construction, Use, and Adaptation of Judicial Decision Support
Systems, 6 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 143, 145 (1998).
222 SENTENCING COMM'N FOR SCOT., supra note 210, para. 4.17,
at 16.
223 Id. para. 8.26, at
37.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Hutton & Tata, supra note 219, at 275.
217
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Wales has maintained a searchable database of sentencing statistics since 1988.227
Strangely, in the twenty-four years of its operation, no effort has been undertaken
to evaluate its effectiveness. There is evidence that some judges actually use the
system by performing searches, 228 but no research has been conducted to assess its
effects on sentencing outcomes.
Over time, however, the New South Wales system has been relegated to a
support role. Beginning in 1998, the Supreme Court of New South Wales began to
announce guideline judgments, which specified an advisory sentencing range for
offenses. 229 In 2003, the New South Wales General Assembly enacted standard
non-parole periodS230 -essentially a statutory determinate sentencing scheme 231
that set presumptive sentences for many serious offenses. Judges are now
permitted to depart from the legislatively prescribed sentence, but only upon
finding facts justifying a departure.23 2 The General Assembly concluded that,
despite the availability of the SIS, inter-judge sentencing disparity had reached
unacceptable levels. The primary reason for the new regime, according to its
supporters, was to reduce that form of disparity.23 3
Canada, Scotland, and New South Wales are not the only jurisdictions that
have experimented with SISs. Promising new systems are underway around the
world, and they may provide new insights on the information sharing model.
Ireland's criminal courts launched a new, publicly accessible web-based 'SIS in
2010.234 Australia recently launched a nationwide SIS, modeled on the New South

227 Miller, supra note 42, at 129, 133. For a detailed description of the system's
origins and functionality, see Potas et al., supra note 207, at 104-14.
228 JUDICIAL COMM'N OF NEW S. WALES, ANNUAL REPORT 2008-09, at 24, fig.7

(2009) (showing some 930,000 pages accessed by judicial officers from 2008 to 2009).
229 See, e.g., R v Jurisic, (1998) 45 NSWLR 209, 229-30. Such guideline judgments
were "intended to be indicative only" and to preserve "flexibility" for sentencing judges,
but reflected the Court's concerns about "[i]nconsistency in sentencing," which "offends

the principle of equality before the law." Id. at 216, 220-21.

230 Freiberg, supra note 211, at 207.
231 For examples of statutory determinate sentencing, see TONRY, supra note 12, at

28.

232 See Freiberg,supra note 211, at 207.

233 See PATRIZIA POLETTI & HUGH DONNELLY, JUDICIAL COMM'N
OF NEW S. WALES,

THE IMPACT OF THE STANDARD NON-PAROLE PERIOD SENTENCING SCHEME ON
SENTENCING PATTERNS IN NEW SOUTH WALES 3 (2010), available at
http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/research-monographs-1/research-monograph33/monograph33.pdf. Preliminary research by the Judicial Commission of New South
Wales indicates that presumptive nonparole sentences have succeeded in improving interjudge consistency. Id. at 59-60 . Some observers, however, have suggested that the real
motivation was to pander to public criticism that sentences were too lenient. See Freiberg,

supra note 211, at 207.

234 See Coulter,supra note 7.
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Wales system, for federal offenses prosecuted throughout the country.235 In the
United States, Missouri has rolled out a web-based system for disseminating
statistics and other sentencing information.23 6 And at least preliminary work has
begun on SIS-type efforts in Israel and England and in state courts in Oregon. 2 3 7 So
far, however, those systems have not been the subject of careful research, and their
future is uncertain.
Sentencing information systems around the world offer valuable insights
about the promise and weaknesses of the information sharing model. A second
sentencing reform effort grounded in the information sharing model, this one
drawn from federal sentencing practice in the United States, is equally instructive.
2. Sentencing Councils

Sentencing councils were groups of district judges, serving on the same court,
who met regularly (typically once per week) to discuss upcoming sentencing
decisions.2 38 Four federal district courts, in Brooklyn, Chicago, Detroit, and
Oregon, experimented with sentencing councils in the 1960s and 1970s. 2 39 The
councils functioned as roundtable discussions of upcoming cases. In advance of the
meeting, all participating judges, including the judge responsible for imposing
sentence, would review the presentence report and other materials and make an
initial recommendation about the appropriate sentence. As a group, judges would
then talk about the evidence, share their views about the most important facts and
considerations, and try to persuade one another. 24 0 Nancy Gertner has compared
sentencing councils to clinical rounds performed by physicians.241
The principal goal of sentencing councils was to reduce inter-judge
disparity.242 Sentencing councils provided the sentencing judge with detailed, casespecific information about how other judges would respond to each new set of
facts. Participating judges saw the work of sentencing councils as an "educational
process" in which judges could "pool[] [their] knowledge and experience and

235

See Wendy Kukulies-Smith, Address at the National Judicial College of Australia

and ANU College of Law Sentencing Conference: The Quest for Sentencing Consistency
in the Federal System 1-6 (Feb. 6, 2010).
236 See Wolff, supra note 60, at
161.
237 See Miller, supra note 42, at
129.
238 See Michael H. Tonry, Sentencing Councils, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME
AND
JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 1483, 1483-84.

Id.; Shari Seidman Diamond & Hans Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study of
Sentence Disparityand Its Reduction, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 109, 116-17 (1975).
240 See Talbot Smith, The Sentencing Council and the Problem of Disproportionate
Sentences, 11 PRAC. LAW. 12, 19-20 (1965).
241 See Nancy Gertner, A Short History ofAmerican Sentencing: Too
Little Law, Too
Much Law, orJust Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 697 (2010).
242 See, e.g., Diamond & Zeisel, supra note 239, at 124; Tonry, supra note
238, at
1483.
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2013]

THE SKEPTIC'S GUIDE TO INFORMATION SHARING AT SENTENCING

391

learn[] from each other." 243 Sharing information about how other judges would
handle the case, they predicted, "will likely have the effect of ameliorating the
likelihood of sentence disparity." 2 44
Consistent with the information sharing model, sentencing councils were
voluntary in two ways. First, the recommendations of other judges at the
sentencing council were merely advisory. The sentencing judge retained sole
discretion to impose the final sentence.245 The goal was to assist, not to restrain:
"No attempt is made at these Councils to impose the will of one upon another."246
Second, in some districts, participation in the sentencing council was itself
optional, and not all judges elected to attend the meetings. 247
Participating judges raved. 248 They found the discussions valuable, reporting
that they frequently changed their views about the appropriate sentence in response
to their colleagues' advice. 249 The discussions, by all accounts, were informal and
friendly. Outside observers were uniformly impressed with the seriousness and
care with which sentencing councils approached each case.250
Yet two major research projects found that sentencing councils did not
meaningfully reduce inter-judge sentencing disparity. 251 Shari Diamond and Hans
Zeisel studied the effects of sentencing councils in Brooklyn and Chicago by
comparing sentencing judges' initial recommendations with their final sentences.
They found strong evidence of inter-judge disparity in the initial recommendations,
with judges' proposed sentences diverging on average by 36.7% in Chicago and
45.5% in Brooklyn.2 52 In their evaluation of cases, the data showed, "some judges
are clearly more severe than others."253 But sentencing councils alleviated only a
small fraction of that disparity. Diamond and Zeisel found that final sentences
imposed, after full discussion with the sentencing council, diverged on average by

243 Smith, supra note 240, at 20.
244 COmm. on the Fed. Courts, Sentencing Practices in the Federal Courts in New
York City, 28 REC. As'N BAR CITY N.Y. 876, 881 (1973).

245 See Comm. on the Fed. Courts, supra note 244, at 881; Diamond & Zeisel, supra

note 239, at 117.

246 Smith, supra note 240, at 20.
247 See Diamond & Zeisel, supra note 239, at 139-40 & tbl.22.
248 See, e.g., Comm. on the Fed. Courts, supra note 244, at 881; Charles T. Hosner,

Group Procedures in Sentencing: A Decade of Practice, 34 FED. PROBATION 18, 20

(1970); Theodore Levin, Toward a More Enlightened Sentencing Procedure, 45 NEB. L.

REV. 499, 505 (1966); Smith, supra note 240, at 21.
249 See Smith, supra note 240, at 19-21 (expressing the view that the sentencing
council was "aiding in the reduction of sentencing disparity").
250 See Hosner, supra note 248, at 19.

251 See Tonry, supra note 238, at 1484 (describing and evaluating both studies).
252 Diamond & Zeisel, supra note 239, at 123 & tbl.6.
253 Id. at 123.
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35.4% in Chicago and 41.1% in Brooklyn.254 They estimated, therefore, that
sentencing councils reduced inter-judge disparity by just 4% to 10%.255
Another study, commissioned by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), examined
the effects of sentencing councils in Detroit, Chicago, and Brooklyn. 2 56 Focusing
on five offense types, the FJC study compared levels of inter-judge disparity in the
years before and after the establishment of the sentencing council.257 The results
were discouraging. In every district, inter-judge disparity actually increased for
some offenses, even as it decreased for others.258 Based on the mixed results, the
study concluded that "councils may increase disparity as frequently as they
decrease it." 259
The experiment did not last. By the mid-1980s, sentencing councils in the
federal courts were abandoned.
3. Lessonsfor the Information Sharing Model
The experiences of SISs and sentencing councils highlight some of the
fundamental weaknesses of the information sharing model. Challenges in
disseminating sentencing information have resulted in struggles, and even the
collapse, of several SISs around the world. Both reform efforts also have suffered
from voluntariness problems, with sentencing courts too often disregarding,
ignoring, or rejecting the available information.
(a) Information Dissemination
Strikingly, in jurisdictions in which SISs have struggled or even collapsed, the
most frequently cited reasons have been practical difficulties with disseminating
the information in a useful way. No system can survive for long if its usersjudges and their court staff-find it cumbersome, confusing, or unhelpful.
Scotland's SIS offers the clearest example. Judges themselves proposed the
development of the system as a tool to improve inter-judge consistency and

Id. at 145 & tbl. 26.
See id. at 147. Professor Michael Tonry has urged caution in interpreting the
Diamond and Zeisel study because it measured sentences using an "arbitrary point scale"
that treated longer probationary sentences as the equivalent of short prison terms, and "[a]
different arbitrary scale would have yielded different results." Tonry, supra note 238, at
1484. In a tautological sense, he is correct; of course using a different scale would produce
"different results," expressed on the new scale. But neither Tonry nor any other researcher
has concluded that a different scale would have altered Diamond and Zeisel's core finding
that sentencing councils had a negligible effect on inter-judge sentencing disparity.
254
255

256 CHARLES DAVID PHILLIPS, SENTENCING COUNCILS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: AN
EVALUATION

61-62 (1981).

Id. at 62-63.
258 Id. at 86-95.
259 Id. at 94.
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rationality. 26 0 They understood that the success of the project depended on a
collective effort, since every narrative description they wrote would be added to a
searchable database available to their colleagues. And they had strong practical
incentives to make it work because the SIS was launched in part to short-circuit
proposals for more intrusive reforms like sentencing guidelines.2 6 1 Yet in just a few
years the system fell into disuse, with judges rarely searching for relevant
*
information* about past
sentencing practice. 262
Complexity was one part of the problem. Although the system's designers
worked with judges in selecting search parameters and boasted about the system's
ease of use and flexibility, judges abandoned the system after a short time in
operation.263 As system designers around the world have acknowledged, an SIS
cannot remain neutral with respect to the factors that are most relevant at
sentencing. 264 Privileging some factors while excluding others inevitably
discourages some users from accessing the available information.2 65
Volume was another. In rolling out the Scottish SIS, system designers had to
train judges never to enter more than a few parameters at once because the system
almost always returned, too few cases. 2 66 Other systems have encountered the
opposite problem. Designers of a fledgling SIS in Israel declined to include
"detailed descriptions" or even "summaries" of cases because, given the large
number of results, "it was felt that judges would not take the time to read case
descriptions."2 67
Those problems can compound one another. Following the launch of the
Scottish SIS, judges who found the system cumbersome and unhelpful did not
always make time to enter detailed and accurate information about their
sentences.268 Such shortcuts and errors made the system less useful, reinforcing
other judges' sense that the effort of producing detailed opinions was a waste of
time and energy. 269 The result was a vicious cycle in which the system gradually
atrophied and ultimately collapsed.
260

Hutton & Tata, supra note 83, at 275; Cyrus Tata, Sentencing and PenalDecision-

Making: Is Scotland Losing Its Distinctive Character?,in CRIMINAL JUSTICE INSCOTLAND

195, 209 (Hazel Croall et al. eds., 2010).
261 Hutton & Tata, supra note 83, at 275; Tata, supra note
264, at 209-10.
262 SENTENCING COMM'N FOR SCOT., supra note 210, para. 8.26,
at 37.

Hutton & Tata, supra note 221, at 44-46.
Miller, supra note 42, at 134; Schild, supra note 99, at 132; Tata, supra note 221,
at 153 (acknowledging that "no [sentencing] data can ever hope to be value-free" and that
judges will not choose to use an SIS if the information lacks "credibility").
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266 Lovegrove, supra note 105, at 37.
267 Schild, supra note 99, at 130-31.
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Privacy concerns also have hampered the success of SISs.270 With few
exceptions, SISs have been made available only to judges and court personnel,
with no access to defense counsel, prosecutors, or the public.2 71 In part, not to the
judges' credit, that kind of secrecy was designed to shield sentencing decisions
from public scrutiny and criticism. 272 But in part it also reflected legitimate
concerns about disclosing deeply personal information about the lives of offenders,
their family members, and victims.273 In the handful of systems that are publicly
accessible, privacy concerns do not arise either because the information is
expressed entirely in the aggregate (as in Missouri), or because records are
anonymous and little detailed case-specific information is available (as in Ireland).
(b) Voluntariness

The abandonment of sentencing councils and the struggles of SISs also
undermine a key assumption of the information sharing model. For information
sharing to reduce inter-judge disparity and promote rationality, judges must
respond to information about previous sentences in similar cases by conforming
their decisions to those of their colleagues. The history of these reform efforts
makes clear that judges frequently respond differently. Of particular concern are
three patterns of response: (1) judges consult the available information but then
disregard it, (2) judges ignore the sentencing information entirely, and (3) judges
polarize their views by shifting to an even more extreme position.
First, the experiences of sentencing councils suggest that judges who
voluntarily consult sentencing information may simply disregard it. Professor
Michael Tonry has concluded that sentencing councils had little effect because
"[t]he council recommendations are only advisory," leaving judges who disagree
with their colleagues free to disregard the advice.2 74 The FJC study concurred,
noting that it should come as no surprise that a strictly voluntary self-reform that
preserved broad discretion for sentencing judges did not meaningfully affect
sentencing outcomes.27 5 Surprisingly, even where judges consciously sought out
the advice of their colleagues-in courts where participation in the sentencing

Tata, supra note 260, at 211 (citing public access to the Scottish SIS as "[t]he key
underlying issue, which was never properly resolved" and an important factor in the
system's collapse).
271 Miller, Map and Compass, supra note 1, at 1388 (noting that Scottish judges have
been "stingy" about disclosing information from the SIS); Freiberg, supra note 211, at 208
(noting that the New South Wales SIS "remains inaccessible to a broader audience,"
270

although some data on federal sentencing in Australia recently became available because of
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272
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council was optional-the effects on inter-judge disparity were negligible.27 6 As
long as the sentencing judge had the final word, sentencing councils had little
effect.277
Second, the experiences of SISs and sentencing councils make clear that
judges in a voluntary system may ignore the information entirely, declining to look
it up even when it is available. The Canadian SIS fell into disuse because, in the
words of the chief designer, "[j]udges do not, as a rule, care to know what
sentences other judges are handing down in comparable cases."2 78 Particularly
troubling is evidence that Canadian judges were especially unlikely to consult the
SIS "if they knew (or thought) that these other judges have different approaches"
than their own. 279 That kind of reluctance prevents the information sharing model
from reducing inter-judge disparity in precisely the category of cases where it
holds the most promise. Similarly, participation in sentencing councils was spotty
when judges' attendance was optional. In the Northern District of Illinois, five of
the court's fourteen judges regularly participated in the sentencing council,
bringing more than 60% of their cases before the sentencing council. 280 But six of
the court's judges elected never to participate, and three others participated only
occasionally, bringing less than 50% of their cases before the council. 28' The result
was that only one-third of criminal sentences benefited from the council's
advice.282 Some judges resisted the procedure on the ground that it would intrude
upon their independent judgment at sentencing, and that it would be a "waste of
time."283
Relatedly, judges may not be fully aware of the ways they ignore available
sentencing information. Experience with SISs also highlights the risk of
confirmation bias when consulting a large body of sentencing information.
Consider the operation of the New South Wales system. Judges can enter a few
search parameters and generate a histogram that shows a distribution of prior
sentences.284 For example, for offenders (1) under the age of twenty-one, who (2)
plead guilty, (3) to driving while intoxicated, the SIS may report that 29% of
offenders received probationary sentences, 24% received sentences of
imprisonment, 21% received intermediate sentences, and 15% received compound
sentences. 285 In theory, judges could review the written opinions in each of the
276 Diamond & Zeisel, supra note 239, at 145, 147.

277 PIERCE O'DONNELL ET AL., TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING
SYSTEM:
AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 18 (1977).

278 Miller, supra note 42, at 130 (quoting Anthony Doob, Sentencing Aids: Final
Report 5 (1989) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)).
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280
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See Diamond & Zeisel, supra note 239, at 139-41 & tbl.22.

281 See id.
282 Id. at 142-43.

283 Comm. on the Fed. Courts, supra note 244, at 881-82 (describing Judge Marvin
Frankel's hypothesis about the degree of resistance revealed by polls of federal judges).
284 See Potas et al., supra note 207, at 119 (illustrating possible chart).
285 Id. (showing an actual report from the New South Wales SIS with similar results).
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approximately 120 cases summarized in the chart, attentive to factors that may be
present in a new case that fits those criteria. Equally likely, however, given the
volume of matching cases and limited time, judges could focus on cases that
confirm the result they already have in mind.
Third, the experiences of sentencing councils suggest judges may respond to
information about other judges' sentences by polarizing their views and adopting
an even more extreme position. The FJC study of sentencing councils found
troubling evidence that, at least for some offenses, the introduction of the councils
coincided with an increase in inter-judge disparity.2 86 The study speculated that
when judges at a sentencing council "meet, for the first time, opposition to their
ideas" about sentencing, the experience "may result in movement to a more
extreme position."2 87 Alternatively, judges with more extreme views "may
convince moderate judges to follow their more lenient or harsh sentencing
patterns."288 Better information about other judges' actions, in other words, did not
necessarily bring about consensus and greater inter-judge consistency. It
sometimes had the opposite effect, serving as a "catalyst[] for the airing of latent
disagreements."28 9
By revealing the full range of ways that judges may respond to available
sentencing information-including disregarding it, avoiding it entirely, or
polarizing their views-the experiences of SISs and sentencing councils
undermine a key assumption of the information sharing model. As Marc Miller has
observed, the power of sentencing information to reduce inter-judge disparity
"depends on how judges use the information ... to guide their own sentencing
judgments." 290 The experiences of SISs and sentencing councils show that judges
do not necessarily respond to better information in ways that promote inter-judge
consistency and rationality.
IV. MAKING INFORMATION SHARING WORK

Based on new and existing research, there is ample reason for skepticism
about the information sharing model. Fundamental weaknesses related to the
collection, dissemination, and voluntariness of sentencing information make
information sharing highly unattractive as an alternative to other structured
sentencing models.
Yet there is also reason for optimism. Information sharing at sentencing may
still perform a valuable function as a supplement to other reforms. Despite the
mixed track record of previous experiments, it is entirely possible that information
sharing can contribute to inter-judge consistency and rationality under the right
conditions. In particular, two features of a sentencing system stand a good chance
See PHILLIPS, supra note 256, at 86-95.
Id. at 94.
288 Id.
289
Id. at 100.
290 See Miller, Map and Compass, supra note 1, at 1377-78.
286
287
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of improving the effectiveness of information sharing: (1) a system of sentencing
guidelines, whether advisory or mandatory; and (2) open access to the store of
sentencing information for defense counsel and prosecutors. Each of those features
helps to address key weaknesses of the information sharing model.

A. Sentencing Guidelines
In light of its weaknesses, the best way to implement the information sharing
model may be as an adjunct to a system of sentencing guidelines. As explained
above, under a typical set of sentencing guidelines, the judge must make a series of
factual determinations about the offense and offender. Based on those facts, the
guidelines specify a sentence or a sentencing range. Depending on the jurisdiction,
that range may be binding in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, or it may
be merely advisory. 291 A set of sentencing guidelines, whether mandatory or
advisory, can make information sharing more effective in promoting inter-judge
consistency and rationality. That is because guidelines perform several functionsdefining terms, operationalizing complex factors, and channeling the attention of
sentencing courts-that make information sharing easier.
First, sentencing guidelines define terms and create a shared vocabulary for
discussions of sentencing. As Professor Marc Miller 'has explained, sentencing
guidelines "create a language of familiar terms and concepts" among sentencing
judges, and that kind of "social language" makes it easier for sentencing judges to
understand one another.29 2 Guideline systems may define and popularize terms of
art like "vulnerable victim," "substantial assistance," or "role in the offense," for
example, that offer sentencing judges a succinct way of describing otherwise
imprecise categories and concepts.2 93
Second, systems of sentencing guidelines operationalize complex sentencing
factors like criminal history. Calculating a guideline sentencing range may depend,
for example, on whether the offender has a previous criminal record. Or it may
depend on the number of prior convictions or the seriousness of those convictions.
Or it may depend on an elaborate scoring system that awards more "criminal
history points" for some kinds of offenses (e.g., felonies or violent crimes) than for
others (e.g., juvenile offenses or older convictions).294 In the same manner,
guidelines systems operationalize a whole host of other factors, such as the
offender's mental state, role in the offense, and the harm caused to victims. It does
not matter, for information sharing purposes, whether the guidelines consider
factors in a sensible or principled way. Simply by choosing one method of taking
those factors into account, a system of guidelines sets a useful baseline.
291 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.

292 Miller, Map and Compass, supra note 1, at 1372-73.
293 Id.
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(prescribing rules for calculating criminal history category under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines).
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Third, sentencing guidelines channel the court's attention to a standard set of
facts and considerations. Some systems, like the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines,
attempt to account for a dizzying number of factors, forcing judges to engage in
extensive and intricate fact finding.295 Other systems are much simpler, taking into
account fewer facts and circumstances and making more general
recommendations. But all guidelines systems focus the court's attention on some
set of especially salient offense and offender information. Even if the guideline
sentencing range is advisory, the process of determining that range is important.
Those basic functions of a guidelines system help to address some of the
major weaknesses of the information sharing model. One set of challenges relates
to the collection of sentencing information. The complexity and volume of
sentencing decisions makes it difficult to collect written, comprehensive, and
representative sentencing information.296 By channeling the efforts of sentencing
courts and requiring that the judge always address some standard set of questions,
sentencing guidelines ensure the availability of a basic level of information about
every case. That minimum level of information reduces (although it certainly does
not eliminate) the risk that noncomprehensive information might mislead future
sentencing courts and thereby generate inter-judge disparity. Guidelines also guard
against a skewed and nonrepresentative pool of cases because the standard set of
findings is required from all judges and in all kinds of cases. It is also possible that
routinely answering a standard set of questions may also change sentencing
judges' habits in a way that encourages more written opinions,, although overly
complex guidelines may have the opposite effect.
Sentencing guidelines also help to address challenges with the dissemination
of sentencing information. 2 97 By operationalizing important sentencing factors,
sentencing guidelines provide a baseline set of categories and concepts that judges
can use when searching for similar and relevant cases. In addition, by supplying a
common vocabulary among sentencing judges, guidelines can make search results
easier to understand, reduce errors based on inconsistent terminology and generally
reduce the risk of user frustration. Of course, a sentencing information system need
not simply replicate the categories and concepts developed in the guidelines.2 98
Still, a framework of sentencing guidelines, with its shared language and baseline
understanding of key factors, improves the chances that judges can use the
information effectively.
Admittedly, to date no research has established that information sharing can
reduce inter-judge disparity or promote rationality. At the same time, however, the
experiences of SISs and sentencing councils do not foreclose the possibility of
successful information sharing within a system of sentencing guidelines. In each of
295 Erik Luna, Misguided Guidelines: A Critique of Federal Sentencing, POL'Y

(Cato Inst., Washington, D.C.), Nov. 1, 2002, at 12 (joking that the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines "make the federal tax code look like Reader's Digest").
296 See supra Part
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297 See supra Part II.B.2.
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the jurisdictions where SISs have failed, they were stand-alone systems in which
judges received little guidance about sentencing. 299 Similarly, sentencing councils
operated in a pre-reform era in federal court, with little external guidance for
sentencing judges.300 Perhaps it is no coincidence that the most successful
information sharing experiments, such as. the SIS developed in-New South Wales,
have survived alongside other forms of structured sentencing like guideline
judgments and standard nonparole periods. 30' Because of the basic functions they
perform, a system of sentencing guidelines likely would improve the chances that
information sharing can succeed.
B. Open Access
Another way to improve the information sharing model is to publicize the
store of sentencing information. The body of written opinions and statistical
information, along with any specialized search tools, could be made available to
defense counsel and prosecutors-not just the court. Publicly sharing information
about sentencing would have obvious benefits for the criminal justice system as a
whole. 302 But open access would be of particular value in overcoming challenges
related to voluntariness and the dissemination of sentencing information.
As discussed above, one major obstacle to effective information sharing at
sentencing is time. Sentencing judges cannot afford routinely to sift through
mountains of information about previous cases to ensure that their decisions are
compatible with those of their colleagues. The experiences of sentencing councils
and SISs reveal when judges decline to consult available information, they
frequently cite timhe constraints as a primary reason. The complexity and volume of
sentencing decisions, which make it difficult to design user-friendly search tools,
can compound the problem by making judges less inclined to track down relevant
cases.
Open access would ease the burden on judges by transferring much of the
case-matching legwork to the lawyers. In their briefs and at sentencing hearings,
the parties could take the lead in identifying potentially relevant cases. That would
reduce the risk of errors in identifying relevant cases, thereby promoting interjudge consistency.303 Although open access would mean more work for counsel,
there is reason to think that lawyers would avail themselves of the information. A
299 Id. at 131-132.

300 Tonry, supra note 238, at 1484; Steve Y. Koh, Reestablishingthe FederalJudge's
Role in Sentencing, 101 YALE L.J. 1109, 1129 (1992).
301 See supra notes 229-233 and accompanying text.

302 Miller, supra note 42, at 146-48 (urging the development of "democratic,
participatory, transparent" sentencing information systems available to "lawyers, judges,
scholars, and reformers" alike).
303 Cf Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a
World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE Li. 1097, 1178-79 (2001) (proposing greater procedural
safeguards for disputed facts at sentencing, on the ground that adversarial testing will
improve accuracy).
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store of information about previous sentences would be one more weapon in
counsel's arsenal in preparation for sentencing. As an example, a decade ago, the
Office of the Federal Public Defender in the District of Massachusetts began
compiling a publicly available collection of downward departure decisions, sorted
by offense type and judge, as a way to improve advocacy on behalf of criminal
defendants.
At the same time, open access would increase the likelihood that the court
will take the information seriously. At sentencing, as in other contexts, judges
make a point of responding to the specific contentions raised by the parties.
Although the information sharing model by design does not compel judges to give
weight to any particular factors at sentencing, even judges who would not
independently seek out information about previous sentences might respond to a
well-formed argument by the prosecutor or defense counsel.
In addition, open access could promote rationality by improving the quality of
the judge's reasoning. Vigorous advocacy is a great asset to a sentencing court.
The parties can draw parallels between cases, debate possible points of distinction,
and urge the judge to accept or reject prior judges' reasoning. It is possible, of
course, that the parties might use the store of sentencing information to stake out
extreme positions that provide little help to the court.305 Yet adversarial testing of
those arguments in principle should help judges reach more thoughtful and
principled outcomes.
The major drawback to open access is the privacy of sentencing information.
Written opinions and other sentencing documents may disclose deeply personal
information about offenders, victims, family members, and witnesses. For
offenders and witnesses who cooperate with the government, open access might
even create a risk of violent retaliation.306
It may be possible to ameliorate those privacy concerns by partially
withholding or redacting sensitive information made available to others.3 07 But too
much redaction could defeat the purpose, undermining the effectiveness of the
information sharing model. For example, in an attempted murder case, the judge
may impose a severe sentence because of the serious long-term physical or
psychological harm to the victim. Withholding that sensitive information would
protect the victim's privacy, but would leave others guessing about the most
important reasons for the sentence. Because personal information often plays a
3 E-mail from Amy Baron-Evans, Sentencing Res. Counsel, Fed. Pub. & Cmty.
Defenders, to author (Aug. 15, 2011) (on file with author).
305 In civil actions for punitive damages, for example, plaintiffs and defendants
notoriously draw comparisons with cases involving either extremely high awards or no

award at all, sometimes leaving trial courts with little discussion of "middle ground" cases
that might serve as better comparisons.
306 See supra Part II.B.
1.
307 See Paul G. Cassell, Treating Crime Victims. Fairly: Integrating Victims into the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2007 UTAH L. REv. 861, 934, 970 (2007)
(discussing methods of protecting privacy while sharing relevant portions of presentence
reports with victims).
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critical role in sentencing outcomes, concealing that information may render
written opinions unhelpful, or even incomprehensible, to future judges and
lawyers.
Although there is no easy way of determining how to withhold or redact
sentencing information, two strategies might prove useful. First, because most
sentencing information does not raise serious privacy concerns, case information
could be presumed accessible unless the parties or the court request that it be
sealed. Defense attorneys and prosecutors would have incentives not to overuse
that power, since they stand to benefit from more complete information in future
cases. Second, the system could be designed to withhold private information only
from the parties, while allowing judges access to complete information. That way,
even if counsel does not fully understand the facts and reasoning of a previous
decision, the sentencing judge can take them into account.
Neither a system of sentencing guidelines nor open access to sentencing
information can guarantee the success of the information sharing model. Its
fundamental weaknesses, along with the poor track record of previous reform
efforts, provide ample reason for skepticism. Yet sentencing guidelines and open
access would help to address challenges related to the collection, dissemination,
and voluntariness of sentencing information. They give the information sharing
model its best chance to succeed.
CONCLUSION
The information sharing model is often advertised as a method of reducing
inter-judge disparity and promoting rationality in sentencing law. Proponents argue
that by assembling a body of written opinions and other information about past
sentences, judges can align their sentences with those of their colleagues.
This Article has identified three fundamental weaknesses in that model. First,
there are daunting information-collection challenges. Because of the complexity
and volume of sentencing decisions, it is difficult for courts to generate sentencing
information that is written, comprehensive, and representative. Second, there are
challenges in disseminating sentencing information in a useful way. Privacy
interests on the part of offenders and others raise serious concerns. In addition, as a
practical matter, it is difficult to make the large volume of relevant information
available to judges in a useful format. Third, the voluntariness of the information
sharing model is an important drawback. Judges retain the discretion to ignore or
reject colleagues' reasoning, undermining inter-judge consistency and rationality.
New and existing research reinforces each of those weaknesses. The Article
contains an original study of information-collection practices in the only federal
court that makes key sentencing documents public. It finds that, despite mandatory
reporting requirements, the court rarely provides the kind of written explanation
needed to support the information sharing model. The history of two other reform
efforts, sentencing information systems and sentencing councils, reveals how
voluntariness and challenges with information dissemination can frustrate
information sharing at sentencing. As the FJC study of sentencing councils
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concluded, history is discouraging for "those who see disparity as a problem that
can be solved by better communication among judges."30 s
More than anything, this "skeptic's guide" makes a plea for realism about
what the information sharing model can accomplish. But information sharing at
sentencing is in its infancy, and therefore the claim here is modest. There is reason
for skepticism that information sharing can serve as an alternative to other
structured sentencing reforms aimed at improving inter-judge consistency and
rationality. But information sharing has real potential as a supplement to other
efforts. In particular, its odds of success would greatly improve if implemented as
part of a system of sentencing guidelines and with open access to the information
for defense counsel and prosecutors.

308 PHILLIPS, supra note 256, at 100.
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APPENDIX

This Appendix provides additional. details concerning case selection and
coding for the empirical study, along with detailed regression results.

A. Case Selection
The study examines Statement of Reasons documents (SORs) for sentences
imposed in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in
fiscal year 2006, which runs from October 1, 2005, to September 30, 2006. As
noted above, the District of Massachusetts is the only federal district court that
makes the documents public, by posting them on the Public Access to Court
Electronic Records (PACER) system as part of the case docket.309
The SORs were collected as part of a related study of inter-judge sentencing
disparity, and the Technical Appendix to that article provides background
information.310 PACER supports case searches by filing date and closing date, but
not by the date of sentencing.311 To identify cases that may include a sentence
imposed in fiscal year 2006, the initial search extended to every criminal case filed
in the district between January 1, 2000, and June 30, 2006.312 The vast majority of
results, including dismissals, jurisdictional transfers, and acquittals, were ignored
because they did not produce a sentence during the relevant period.
The result was a body of 411 SORs for sentences imposed in fiscal year 2006.
The Sentencing Commission reports that the district as a whole submitted
documentation for 512 sentences that year. 313 The SORs examined here therefore
represent 80.3% of the total. There are several possible explanations for the
missing SORs. First, although the District of Massachusetts generally makes SORs
available on PACER, in some cases the SOR is unavailable or the docket indicates
that the SOR is sealed. Judges retain the power to seal the SOR for case-specific
reasons, such as the protection of offenders or witnesses who have cooperated with
the government. 314 Second, cases filed before 2000 with a sentence in 2006-for
example, cases extended by appeal and remand or complex conspiracy cases with
many defendants-would have escaped the initial search. Thus, although the
available set of 411 documents includes more than 80% of the total, it is not
complete.
309 See supra notes 178-180 and accompanying text.
310 See Scott, supra note 16, at 54-55.

31 The date of sentencing rarely matches the closing date because of multipledefendant cases, appeals, supervised release hearings, and other postsentence filings.

312 PACER's "Reports" tool allows searches by "Case Type," including criminal
cases. The search included pending and terminated defendants, but excluded cases
involving fugitive defendants.
313 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 203, at 211 (reporting a total of 512
Statements of Reasons received from the District of Massachusetts).
314 United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 277 n.66 (D. Mass. 2004) (citing
Minutes of the Court Meeting of the District of Massachusetts 4 (Sept. 4, 2001)).
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Nor are the available SORs necessarily a random sample of the total. It is
possible that SORs that do not appear on PACER differ in important ways, such as
the level of written explanation provided, from the SORs that are available.
Fortunately, as Table Al indicates, the SORs available on PACER differ only
slightly from the total population of SORs submitted to the Commission:
Table Al: Comparison of All Cases and Available SORs
District of Massachusetts, FY 2006315
All Cases
FY 2006

SOR Available on
PACER

Total Cases

516

411

Imprisonment Ordered

87.6%

81.8%

Average Prison Sentence

73.0 months

78.1 months

Below Guideline Range

24.8%

29.7%

Above Guideline Range

1.2%

2.9%

Within Guideline Range or
Government-Sponsored Departure

Although modest, potential differences between the available SORs on
PACER and the full pool of SORs submitted to the Commission are a reason for
caution.

B. Coding
To measure the level of written explanation contained in each SOR, a research
assistant counted the total number of sentences of text provided. The count
included written explanations from all three of the SOR form's narrative
description fields. It also included written explanations contained in any
attachments, such as published sentencing opinions and hearing transcripts. In
those cases, however, the count included only portions of the opinion or
proceeding in which the judge provided reasons for the sentence imposed. It
excluded, for example, discussion of guideline calculations, constitutional
challenges, and procedural matters.
In some cases, the SOR contains only a generic statement with no discussion
of the particular offense or offender. As an example, some SORs state: "I have
considered the factors set forth in § 3553(a) and I have imposed a sentence

315 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 203, at 211.
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sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to achieve those purposes."1 Because
generic statements of that kind merely restate the judge's task, without providing
any explanation of the sentence imposed, they were coded as zero sentences of
explanatory text.
In addition, SOR forms were coded for whether any checkboxes were marked
to explain the sentence. The checkbox condition was considered satisfied if any
checkbox was marked in any section of the SOR form that lists reasons for the
sentence. Checkboxes unrelated to the reasons for the sentence, such as those
describing whether a fine was imposed or the presentence report was adopted, did
not satisfy the checkbox condition.
The study reports the results of two logistic regression models, each based on
a different dependent variable. Logistic regression was necessary because both
dependent variables are binary rather than normally distributed. The first is
whether the SOR contains any written explanation of the sentence. If the SOR
contains zero sentences of explanatory text, then the dependent variable is coded as
zero. If the SOR contains one or more sentences of explanatory text, then the
dependent variable is coded as one. A mark in a checkbox was not coded as a form
of written explanation.
The second is whether the SOR contains a long written explanation,
consisting of at least ten sentences of text. That cutoff corresponds to roughly one
page of narrative description, and was considered a reasonable proxy for the kind
of explanation sufficient to provide meaningful information about the reasons for
the sentence to another judge. If the SOR contains ten or more sentences of
explanatory text, then the dependent variable is coded as one. If the SOR contains
fewer than nine sentences, then the dependent variable is coded as zero.
Both models include the following independent variables:
(1) Sentence length, in months. Sentence length is coded as length of the term
of imprisonment, measured in months. Consistent with the Sentencing
Commission's practice, sentences of probation were coded as zero months of
imprisonment.3 17
(2) Nonguideline sentence, an indicator. Nonguideline sentences include
sentences above or below the guideline sentencing range, whether styled as a
"departure," a post-Booker "variance," or using another term. Following the
Commission's conventions, government-sponsored below-range sentences were
coded as within range.
(3) Within-range sentences of more than twenty-four months, an indicator.
This dummy variable was coded because the SOR form requires a written narrative
explanation for that category of sentences, but not for other within-range
sentences.
(4) Sentence of time served, an indicator. Sentences of time served present
special challenges. In the federal system, offenders may receive credit for time
316 The statement closely tracks 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006), which sets out factors

that a judge must consider at sentencing.
317

See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 62 (employing the same convention).
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served in official detention prior to sentencing. 3 18 It is common for a judge to
impose a sentence of time served, allowing the offender to be released
immediately. The sentence is not zero months of imprisonment because the
offender is credited by statute for serving time. But SOR forms sometimes list the
sentence simply as "time served," with no indication of the length of presentence
detention for which the offender has been credited. Lacking more precise
information, sentences of time served were coded as zero months of imprisonment,
but an additional dummy indicator was added to permit analysis of those cases.
In addition, one model uses dummy variables that capture the identity of the
sentencing judge. To avoid the distorting effects of judges with low caseloads,.
such as those in senior status, those models exclude sentences by judges with fewer
than fifteen sentences during the fiscal year. 3 19 Following standard practice for
categorical variables, one judge was omitted as a reference category. The second
model, based on long explanations, does not include judge dummy variables
because too many judges submitted no long explanations during the year of the
study.

C. Regression Results
The first model describes factors that predict whether the Statement of
Reasons contains any written explanation. Table 1 reports the results:

18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).
Cf James M. Anderson et al., Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity:Before
and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271, 288 (1999) (limiting
318

319

analysis of inter-judge disparity to judges who imposed at least thirty cases in a two-year
period).
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Table 1: Logistic Regression Model,
Written Explanation Provided
Variable

Coefficient

Standard
Error

Significance

(Constant)

-1.153

0.676

.088

Sentence Length

0.007

0.002

.001*

Sentence of Time Served

0.409

0.900

.649

Nonguideline Sentence

3.320

0.392

< .001*

Within-Range Over 24 Months

0.719

0.579

.214

Judge Identity (categorical)

.001*

Model significance: < .001*
Chi-square: 183.866

*

Significant at the .05 level
n = 398

The model indicates that some kinds of sentences are more likely to produce a
written explanation than others. Nonguideline sentences, longer terms of
imprisonment, and the identity of the judge are significantly correlated with written
explanations. A within-range sentence of more than twenty-four months, however,
is not a significant predictor of a written explanation, after controlling for other
factors. This casts doubt on the effectiveness of SOR forms' instructions, which
require a written explanation in those circumstances.
The second model describes factors that predict whether the Statement of
Reasons contains a long written explanation of ten or more sentences. Table 2
reports the results:
Table 2: Logistic Regression Model,
Long Explanation (10+ sentences) Provided
Variable

Coefficient

Standard
Error

Significance

(Constant)

-4.495

1.006

< .001*

Sentence Length

-0.003

0.004

.482

Nonguideline Sentence

1.086

0.519

.037*

Within-Range Over 24 Months

1.338

1.124

.234

Model significance: <.001*
Chi-square: 11.185

*

Significant at the .05 level
n =408
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Nonguideline sentences are significantly correlated with long explanations.
Neither sentence length nor within-range sentences above twenty-four months,
however, is a statistically significant predictor of a long explanation.

